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MARYLAND’S “WAL-MART” ACT: 
POLICY AND PREEMPTION 
Edward A. Zelinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In response to negotiations to bring a Wal-Mart regional 
distribution center to Maryland,1 that state’s legislature passed, over 
gubernatorial veto, a statute mandating that Wal-Mart expend a 
minimum percentage of its Maryland payroll on health care for Wal-
Mart’s Maryland employees.  The Maryland law is scheduled to take 
effect on January 1, 2007 and has spurred interest in similar legislation 
in other states. 
The Maryland statute raises two fundamental questions: Is the 
statute legal?  Does the statute represent sound policy?  I write to 
explore both of these questions. 
With respect to the legality of the Maryland statute, I conclude that 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2 
preempts the Maryland law.  I thus agree with the recent decision of 
Judge Motz of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, 
holding Maryland’s Wal-Mart Act to be ERISA-preempted.3 
 
 *  Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; 
Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School.  For helpful comments on earlier drafts, Professor 
Zelinsky thanks Attorneys Debra A. Davis, Alvin D. Lurie and Chantel Sheaks; Professors Eric 
D. Chason, Jonathan Barry Forman, John H. Langbein, Paul M. Secunda, and James A. Wooten; 
Doris Zelinsky, Joshua Zelinsky (Yale College class of 2007) and Aaron Zelinsky (Yale Law 
School class of 2010); and Catherine Murray and Megan Burrows (both Cardozo class of 2006).  
Professor Zelinsky has no financial or other ties to Wal-Mart or to opponents or supporters of the 
Act (though, at any moment, it is possible that one of the mutual funds in Professor Zelinsky’s 
403(b) accounts holds Wal-Mart stock).  Professor Zelinsky has received no financial or other 
assistance or encouragement from Wal-Mart or the Act’s opponents or supporters. 
 1 See Mike Billington & Patrick Jackson, Md. Health Care Requirements Could Send Wal-
Mart to Del.; Benefits Wouldn’t Cost as Much in First State, NEWS J., Jan. 23, 2006, at 1A. 
 2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)). 
 3 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006).  In 
addition to the ERISA preemption issue, District Judge Motz addressed the procedural questions 
of standing and ripeness, the jurisdictional import of the Federal Tax Injunction Act, and the 
substantive status of the Wal-Mart Act under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  My analysis focuses only on the ERISA preemption question. 
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Since, as a matter of federalism, I favor state experimentation as to 
medical care, I regret this outcome on normative grounds.  Maryland (or 
any other state) should be free to experiment in this area.  However, 
under any of the plausible approaches to ERISA preemption, ERISA 
Section 514(a), as a matter of law, preempts the Maryland statute and 
others like it. 
As a matter of policy, the Maryland statute is ill-conceived.  The 
Maryland statute raises prices on Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-
income customers and, for the long-run, will reduce Wal-Mart’s 
employment.  Maryland, and other states, have far more compelling 
options for assisting low-income workers including expansion of state 
earned income tax credits.  While states should be free to experiment, 
the Maryland statute, even if it passed muster under ERISA, would not 
be a compelling experiment. 
In the final analysis, Maryland’s Wal-Mart Act is a poorly-
designed exercise in political symbolism, rather than a carefully-crafted 
response to the pressing problem of health care in America. 
 
I.     THE MARYLAND ACT 
 
Maryland’s Wal-Mart statute is formally denoted the “Fair Share 
Health Care Fund Act”4 and nominally5 covers all non-governmental 
employers with 10,000 or more employees in the State of Maryland.6  
Substantively,7 the Act provides that, if a covered employer operates on 
a for-profit basis, the employer, as of January 1, 2007, must spend on 
“health insurance costs” an amount equal to at least “8% of the total 
wages paid” to the employer’s Maryland employees.8  If a covered 
employer is “a nonprofit organization,” the Act provides that the 
employer must spend on health insurance an amount equal to at least six 
percent of the total wages paid to the employer’s Maryland employees.9 
If a covered employer fails to spend the required amount on health 
insurance, the Act obligates the employer to pay to the Maryland Fair 
Share Health Care Fund10 the difference between the employer’s actual 
 
 4 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 
107(West 2006)). 
 5 In practice, the Act is aimed at a single employer: Wal-Mart.  See infra note 14 and 
accompanying text. 
 6 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act § 1. 
 7 As a procedural matter, the Act requires that employers report on their payrolls and their 
outlays for health insurance costs and that summary reports be sent to the Governor and General 
Assembly.  Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-101(h) (West 2006) (defining the 
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health insurance outlays and the employer’s statutorily-required health 
insurance outlays.  The Fund, in turn, helps to finance the Maryland’s 
Medicaid program for low-income residents.11  Employers are 
specifically forbidden from deducting from their employees’ wages the 
employers’ statutorily-mandated payments to the Fair Share Health 
Care Fund.12 
While the Act raises several interpretative issues,13 the import of 
the Act is clear: A covered employer must either devote a minimum 
percentage of total payroll to employee health care or must pay the 
shortfall to the Fund financing Maryland’s Medicaid program.  Equally 
clear is the target of the Act: Wal-Mart.  In practice (and everyone 
acknowledges this), the Maryland Act “applies only to one employer in 
the state—Wal-Mart Stores Inc.—because the other employers” covered 
by the Act “already provide [health] benefits that cost them more than 
8% of payroll.”14  The adoption of the Act in Maryland has spurred 
 
“program” as the “Maryland Medical Assistance Program”).  
 11 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-103. 
 12 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act § 1. 
 13 For example, the Act counts as part of an employer’s health insurance outlays the 
employer’s contributions to medical savings accounts, now technically labeled by the Internal 
Revenue Code as Archer Medical Savings Accounts.  However, under the Internal Revenue 
Code, such accounts are limited to small employers, i.e., those with fifty or fewer employees.  
Thus, no covered employer under the Act (with 10,000 or more Maryland employees) could ever 
contribute to a medical savings account.  Moreover, no new medical savings accounts can be 
established after December 31, 2005.  An employer covered by the Maryland Act can contribute 
to health savings accounts, which are not limited to small employers.  However, such health 
savings accounts are not referenced by the Act.  Id. (counting contributions to medical savings 
accounts as “health insurance costs” and limiting the coverage of the Act to employers “with 
10,000 or more employees in” Maryland); see also I.R.C. § 220(c) (2000) (restricting Archer 
Medical Savings Accounts to employees of small employers); id. § 220(i) (prohibiting the 
establishment of new medical savings accounts after December 31, 2005); id. § 223 (no 
equivalent restrictions on health savings accounts). 
  Another curious feature of the Act is the discrepancy between the Act’s reporting 
requirements and its substantive mandate.  When reporting under the Act, a covered employer 
may exclude from its reported wages both wages paid in an amount above Maryland’s median 
household income and wages paid to an employee enrolled in or eligible to enroll in Medicare.  
However, as a substantive matter, a covered employer is obligated to pay as health care outlays a 
minimum percentage of “total wages” without these exclusions.  Compare MD. CODE ANN., LAB. 
& EMPL. § 8.5-103 (listing wage exclusions for reporting purposes), with MD. CODE ANN., LAB. 
& EMPL. § 8.5-104 (using “total wages” as base for determining compliance with the Act). 
  It is widely believed that the special definition of wages in Section 8.5-103 removes 
Northrop Grumman from the coverage of the Act.  See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler 
(RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md. 2006) (“This exclusion permits Northrop Grumman to 
meet the requirement.”).  However, a careful reading of the Act suggests that, if this was the 
Maryland legislature’s intent, it did not quite embody that intent in the actual statute. 
  Presumably these and other similar issues will be addressed by technical corrections 
legislation or regulations.  In the meantime, these interpretative issues do not impair the Act’s 
basic message: Wal-Mart must either increase its medical insurance outlays as a percentage of 
total wages paid to Maryland employees or it must pay the shortfall to the Fund to support 
Maryland’s Medicaid program. 
 14 Joanne Wojcik, “Wal-Mart Bill” Spurs Coverage Mandates, BUS. INS., Jan. 23, 2006, at 1; 
see also Letter from J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Md. Attorney Gen., to Michael E. Busch, Speaker of 
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interest in similar legislation in other states15 as well as litigation 
challenging the Act.16  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maryland has held the Maryland Act to be ERISA-preempted.17  The 
Attorney General of Maryland has appealed that decision to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.18 
 
II.     DOES ERISA PREEMPT THE MARYLAND ACT? 
 
ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA Section 514(a), demonstrates 
how a seemingly straightforward statute can engender enormous legal 
controversy.  With beguiling simplicity, Section 514(a) provides that 
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any” pension or welfare plan governed by 
ERISA.19  For ERISA purposes, employers’ arrangements for their 
 
the Md. House, at 2 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/ 
Advice2006/busch06.pdf#search=%22attorney%20general%20of%20maryland%20busch%20fair
%20share%20act%22 [hereinafter Attorney General’s Letter] (observing that only three Maryland 
employers have more than 10,000 in-state employees and that “[o]f these three, only Wal-Mart 
has health insurance costs low enough to be subject to the payroll assessment.”).  While the 
Attorney General identifies Wal-Mart, Johns Hopkins University, and Giant Foods as the three 
employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees, there is apparently a fourth such employer, 
Northrop Grumman.  See RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
 15 Karen Setze, Many States Consider ‘Fair Share’ Healthcare Bills; Few Enacted, ST. TAX 
TODAY, July 14, 2006, at 135-1;. see also Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart to Expand Health Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at C1 (“[A] dozen other states, including California, Colorado and 
Rhode Island, are considering similar bills.”); Deloitte Wash. Bulletin, Feb. 27, 2006, at 2-3 
(citing the National Conference of State Legislatures for the proposition that legislation similar to 
the Maryland Act is “pending in twenty states”); Danny Hakim et al., Wal-Mart Looms Over 2 
Bills To Improve Worker Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at B1 (“The national effort to 
force Wal-Mart and other employers to provide better health care coverage came to Albany on 
Tuesday . . . .”); Ritu Kalra, Wal-Mart Faults Health Insurance Idea, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 
17, 2006, at E1 (legislation similar to the Maryland Act introduced in Connecticut and defeated in 
New Hampshire and Washington); Andy Miller, Health Bill Targets Wal-Mart: State’s Soaring 
Costs Cited, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 14, 2006, at C1 (legislation similar to Maryland Act 
introduced in Georgia).  The California legislature passed a “near clone” of the Maryland Wal-
Mart Act.  See Karen Setze, California Lawmakers OK Measure Similar to Maryland’s “Wal-
Mart Bill,” ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 5, 2006, at 171-19.  This bill was vetoed by Governor 
Schwarzenegger.   See Karen Setze, California Governor Vetoes Healthcare Requirement for 
Large Employers, ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 19, 2006, at 181-2. 
 16 See RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 481; Miller, supra note 15 (discussing the lawsuit filed by the 
Retail Industry Leaders Association against the Maryland Act); Deloitte, supra note 15 (same); 
see also Karen Setze, Judge Hears Oral Arguments in Suit Against Maryland’s ‘Wal-Mart Bill,’ 
ST. TAX TODAY, June 23, 2006, at 122-18. 
 17 RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 489-92.  
 18 Karen Setze, Maryland Attorney General Appeals ‘Wal-Mart Bill’ Ruling, ST. TAX 
TODAY, July 24, 2006, at 142-13. 
 19 The plans “established or maintained” by virtually all non-governmental, non-church 
employers are covered by ERISA.  In particular, Wal-Mart’s medical plans are ERISA-regulated.  
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 4, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)). 
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employees’ medical coverage are “welfare plans,” subject to the 
strictures of ERISA.20  Thus, state laws “relat[ing] to” employers’ 
ERISA-regulated medical plans are, per Section 514(a), preempted. 
Despite the apparent simplicity of Section 514(a), in practice, the 
task of construing Section 514(a) has been anything but simple: 
“[R]elate to” has proved to be an elusive legal standard.  However, 
under any of the plausible approaches to Section 514, that section 
preempts the Maryland Act.  The Fourth Circuit should accordingly 
affirm the District Court’s decision holding the Act to be ERISA-
preempted. 
 
A.     Shaw 
 
During ERISA’s early history, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted 
the language of Section 514(a) capaciously,21 striking a host of state 
laws under Section 514(a) on the grounds that such state laws had “a 
connection with or reference to” ERISA-governed pension or welfare 
plans.22  Under this expansive approach to Section 514(a) and its “relate 
to” terminology, ERISA preemption was nearly automatic whenever a 
state law touched an ERISA-regulated plan.  The Court first articulated 
its broad understanding of Section 514(a) in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc. by striking as ERISA-preempted a New York State law which 
mandated that employers provide pregnancy disability benefits to their 
employees.23  Under this broad understanding of Section 514(a), ERISA 
preempts the Maryland Act by referring to and connecting with covered 
employers’ ERISA-governed medical plans.  The health care outlays 
regulated by the Maryland Act necessarily entail such plans while the 
employer’s liability under the Act can be determined only by 
considering the covered employer’s payments pursuant to such plans. 
Typical of the expansive, Shaw-based approach to Section 514(a) 
(and particularly instructive as to the Maryland Act) is the last case of 
the Shaw line, District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of 
Trade.24  The District of Columbia had amended its workers’ 
compensation law to require employers maintaining health care 
coverage for their current employees to also provide equivalent 
 
 20 ERISA § 3(1)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)) (ERISA-regulated welfare 
plans include any employer “plan, fund, or program” providing “medical, surgical, or hospital 
care or benefits” “through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.”). 
 21 This capacious understanding of Section 514(a) is discussed in Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 807, 815-27 (1999). 
 22 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). 
 23 Id. 
 24 506 U.S. 125 (1992). 
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coverage for injured former employees eligible for workers’ 
compensation payments.  Following the capacious interpretation of 
Section 514(a) announced in Shaw, the Court struck the D.C. law as 
impermissibly “relat[ing] to” employers’ medical plans and as thus 
ERISA-preempted. 
For eight Justices, Washington Board of Trade was an easy case, 
controlled by “the ordinary meaning of ‘relate to’” determinable from 
the dictionary.25  Since the D.C. workers’ compensation law 
“specifically refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA,” i.e., 
employers’ medical plans for their current employees, “on that basis 
alone” the D.C. law is preempted.26 
Moreover, the Court observed, it is of no moment whether a 
challenged state law is “specifically designed to affect” ERISA-
regulated plans or whether the challenged state law has an effect on 
such plans which “is only indirect.”27  By the same token, a state law is 
ERISA-preempted if it refers to or has a connection with an ERISA-
regulated plan even if the challenged state “law is ‘consistent with 
ERISA’s substantive requirements.’”28 
Under the original, Shaw-based understanding of Section 514(a) as 
applied in Washington Board of Trade, Section 514(a) preempts the 
Maryland Act since the Act refers to and has a connection with covered 
employers’ medical programs for their employees.  Indeed, the Act 
intrudes directly upon such plans, mandating the minimum level of 
covered employers’ outlays for their employees’ medical coverage.  The 
medical care expenditures regulated by the Maryland Act necessarily 
entail ERISA-governed employer plans while the employer’s 
obligations under the Act can be assessed only by taking into account 
the employer’s payments pursuant to such plans. 
Consider initially the Act’s definitions of “health insurance costs:” 
“Health insurance costs” means the amount paid by an employer to 
provide health care or health insurance to employees in the State to 
the extent the costs may be deductible by an employer under federal 
tax law.29 
“Health insurance costs” includes payments for medical care, 
prescription drugs, vision care, medical savings accounts, and any 
other costs to provide health benefits as defined in Section 213(d) of 
the Internal Revenue Code.30 
 
 25 Id. at 129. 
 26 Id. at 130. 
 27 Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)). 
 28 Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)). 
 29 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3, § 1 (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 
107) (West 2006)). 
 30 Id. 
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These definitions of “insurance costs” sweep far more broadly than 
insurance to include any “health care” expense which is deductible for 
federal income tax purposes.  In particular, an employer’s self-funded 
health care outlays from the employer’s general assets count as 
“insurance costs” under the Act.  Thus, the Act’s term “insurance costs” 
is quite inelegant;31 more accurately, that term encompasses the totality 
of the covered employer’s health care outlays for its employees.32 
In light of these definitions, whether a covered employer has 
complied with the Act can only be ascertained with reference to the 
employer’s ERISA-regulated health care plans for its employees.  The 
Act defines “health insurance costs” as the health care expenditures 
made pursuant to such plans.  In this respect, the Maryland Act is like 
the D.C. workers’ compensation law struck as ERISA-preempted in 
Washington Board of Trade.  The D.C. law referred to the employer’s 
programs for employee health care to determine the level of medical 
coverage required for injured former employees.  Similarly, the 
Maryland Act refers to the employer’s outlays for employee health care 
to determine if the statutory minimum health care outlay has been 
satisfied.  In Washington Board of Trade, the Supreme Court declared 
that the former reference triggers Section 514(a) and ERISA 
preemption.  If that remains the test, then the similar reference under the 
Maryland statute to employers’ health care outlays likewise results in 
ERISA preemption of the Act. 
Moreover, as a substantive matter, the Maryland Act intrudes 
deeply upon the operations of the covered employer’s ERISA-regulated 
medical plans.  Under the D.C. workers’ compensation law, the 
employer’s medical arrangements for its employees merely served as a 
touchstone, a yardstick with which to measure the health coverage the 
employer owed to former employees receiving workers’ compensation 
payments.  That connection between employers’ medical plans and the 
D.C. law was enough to trigger ERISA preemption under the expansive 
Shaw standard. 
On the other hand, the Maryland Act constitutes a substantive 
regulation of the covered employer’s medical plan, a statutory directive 
either to expend a minimum percentage of payroll for medical coverage 
or to contribute the shortfall to the Fund.  If the D.C. law, which 
referred to but did not regulate employers’ medical plans, is ERISA-
preempted, a fortiori the Maryland Act, which both refers to and 
regulates such plans, is ERISA-preempted. 
 
 31 As discussed infra, this inelegance may not be accidental but, rather, may be an 
unpersuasive effort to qualify the Act as insurance regulation, exempted from preemption under 
ERISA § 514(b).  See infra Part II.D. 
 32 This observation proves particularly important when considering whether the Maryland 
Act survives ERISA preemption as an insurance regulation.  See infra Part II.D. 
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In this context, District Judge Motz’s observation is compelling: 
“The reference in the Fair Share Act to ERISA plans is direct and 
express.”33 
In contrast to my analysis and Judge Motz’s conclusion, 
Maryland’s Attorney General argues that ERISA does not preempt the 
Act because, he contends, the Act “does not specifically refer to 
employee welfare benefit plans.”  Rather, the Attorney General asserts, 
the Maryland Act refers to the covered employer’s health care outlays 
including outlays made “outside the structure of a plan.”34  ERISA 
Section 514(a) only preempts state laws insofar as such laws “relate to” 
employers’ benefit plans, not insofar as such laws relate to employers’ 
benefit outlays.  Hence, the Attorney General concludes, the Act, which 
regulates employer outlays but not employer plans, survives a 
preemption challenge under Section 514(a). 
For four reasons, the Attorney General’s approach to Section 
514(a) and the Act is unpersuasive.  First, that approach eviscerates the 
Court’s ERISA preemption case law, rendering ERISA preemption 
easily avoidable through the semantic expedient of framing state 
regulation in terms of employers’ outlays.  Second, under the statute, 
regulations, and case law, medical expenditures by an employer like 
Wal-Mart necessarily entail the kind of ongoing commitment which 
constitutes a “plan, fund, or program” for ERISA purposes.  Third, Wal-
Mart can determine its compliance with the Act and calculate any 
amount owed to the Fund only by considering each ERISA-regulated 
medical plan Wal-Mart maintains for its employees.  Finally, even if the 
Act does not refer to the covered employer’s ERISA-regulated medical 
plans, the Act has a connection with such plans since, as just noted, only 
by considering such plans can the employer determine whether it has 
complied with the Act and, if not, the amount owed to the Fund, i.e., 
eight percent of payroll minus the employer’s outlays to its employee 
health care plans. 
As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s argument proves too 
much.  Indeed, the Attorney General’s interpretation of Section 514(a) 
eviscerates much of the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption case law, 
rendering ERISA preemption a mere matter of the verbiage deployed by 
the state. 
Take, for example, Shaw, under which the Court struck as ERISA-
preempted the New York State law mandating pregnancy disability 
benefits.  Under the Maryland Attorney General’s approach to Section 
514(a), New York could mandate such benefits merely by getting the 
semantics right.  All New York need do is phrase its requirement in 
 
 33 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 494 n.12 (D. Md. 
2006). 
 34 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 2-3. 
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terms of mandated employer outlays, e.g., “any employer making 
disability outlays must make outlays for pregnancy-related disabilities.”  
According to the Attorney General, this verbal formulation makes the 
ERISA preemption problem disappear. 
Washington Board of Trade becomes a similarly sterile exercise in 
semantics under the Attorney General’s theory of ERISA preemption. 
Under that theory, the District of Columbia’s requirement can be 
reframed in terms of employers’ expenditures for medical insurance, 
e.g., “any employer making medical expenditures for employees must 
also make medical expenditures for injured former employees.”  In this 
case also, ERISA preemption is again overcome as ERISA preemption 
is merely a matter of the proper verbal formula, that is, referring to 
employer outlays rather than to employer plans. 
Second, contra the Attorney General’s position, for an employer 
like Wal-Mart, employer expenditures for medical coverage necessarily 
entail the existence of a plan to implement ongoing coverage.  The legal 
threshold for finding an ERISA welfare plan is low.  Consequently, the 
health care expenses regulated by the Act necessarily imply the 
existence of one or more ERISA-regulated plans to undertake those 
expenses. 
As a statutory matter, ERISA broadly defines a welfare “plan” as 
any “plan, fund, or program” that provides one or more of the kinds of 
benefits specified by the statute.35  Medical coverage is among these 
specified benefits.  How can an employer like Wal-Mart provide 
medical coverage for its employees without, implicitly or explicitly, 
having a “plan, fund, or program” for such coverage? 
If an employer spontaneously pays an employee’s medical 
expenses from the employer’s general assets, that isolated payment 
would not constitute an ERISA-regulated plan.  However, short of that 
kind of isolated ad hoc outlay, employer expenses for employees’ 
medical care involve some kind of “program.” 
Some have suggested that Wal-Mart, as the covered employer 
under the Act, could designate year-end bonuses as “health care 
bonuses” without thereby creating an ERISA plan for medical care.36  If 
this is done once on a spontaneous basis, perhaps so.  However, under 
the statute, it takes little to turn this practice into an employer program 
for ERISA purposes.  If the employer designates year-end payments as 
“health care bonuses” for a second year, the employer thereby 
demonstrates that it has a “program” to do so.  And, in any event, such 
 
 35 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(1), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000)). 
 36 David B. Brandolph, Preemption: Challenge to Maryland “Wal-Mart” Law Provokes 
Debate Among ERISA Experts, 33 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 570 (Feb. 28, 2006) (quoting 
attorney Marc I. Machiz). 
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year-end bonuses would not constitute “health insurance costs” within 
the meaning of the Maryland Act since those bonuses would not 
reimburse for specific health care outlays and since the employees could 
spend such bonuses as they see fit.37 
It has also been suggested38 that an employer’s payments to health 
savings accounts (HSAs) would not constitute a “plan” for ERISA 
purposes.39  The Department of Labor (DOL) has indicated otherwise.40  
If an employer, pursuant to the relevant regulations,41 merely collects 
employees’ voluntary contributions “through payroll deductions” and 
remits these employee contributions “without endorsing the program” 
or itself contributing to the health savings accounts, no ERISA plan 
exists.42  However, if the employer leaves this narrow safe-harbor—by 
endorsing the HSA program, by contributing its own funds to the 
employees’ accounts or by paying the premiums for the high deductible 
health coverage to which HSAs must be linked43—the employer 
establishes an ERISA-regulated plan.  And, if Wal-Mart does not leave 
the regulatory safe-harbor by contributing its own funds, Wal-Mart has 
not paid any “health insurance costs” within the meaning of the 
Maryland Act. 
The import of the controlling case law is the same, namely, that 
employer “health insurance costs” within the meaning of the Act 
necessarily entail an ERISA-governed medical plan.  To buttress his 
argument that the Act escapes ERISA preemption, Maryland’s Attorney 
General cites Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne44 and argues that 
employers may make “health care expenditures” which are not “part of 
a plan.”45  However, a careful review of Fort Halifax confirms that, 
except in the rarest of cases, employer expenditures for medical 
coverage necessarily imply the existence of an ERISA-regulated “plan, 
fund, or program” to make such continuing expenditures. 
 
 37 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 107 
(West 2006)).  The Act’s definitions of “health insurance costs” would not include a year-end 
bonus that does not reimburse for specific medical outlays and which the employee can spend for 
non-medical purposes. 
 38 Brandolph, supra note 36.  For the reasons indicated in the text, Judge Motz of the U.S. 
District Court correctly rejected the claim that a covered firm could comply with the Act via 
HSAs that do not constitute an ERISA-regulated plan.  RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 491-92. 
 39 Such payments to health savings accounts would not count as “health insurance costs” for 
purposes of the Act.  See supra note 13. 
 40 See Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor, Op. No. 2004-09 A 
(Dec. 22, 2004) [hereinafter EBSA Op. No. 2004-09 A]. 
 41 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2006). 
 42 EBSA Op. No. 2004-09 A, supra note 40.   
 43 See I.R.C. § 223(c) (2000) (an individual is eligible for an HSA only if such individual is 
“covered under a high deductible health plan”). 
 44 482 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 45 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 3. 
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The Fort Halifax Court sustained against an ERISA preemption 
challenge “a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time 
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.”46  In 
this context, the Court held, there was no employer plan within the 
meaning of ERISA.  According to the Court, a welfare plan exists “with 
respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires an ongoing 
administrative program to meet the employer’s obligation.”47  In 
contrast, the Maine law requiring employers to pay severance payments 
on plant closings imposed a contingent obligation for the employer to 
make a single outlay: 
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to 
maintain, an employee benefit plan.  The requirement of a one-time, 
lump-sum payment triggered by a single event requires no 
administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the employer’s obligation.  
The employer assumes no responsibility to pay benefits on a regular 
basis, and thus faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a 
need for financial coordination and control.  Rather, the employer’s 
obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency 
that may never materialize.  The employer may well never have to 
pay the severance benefits.48 
An employer like Wal-Mart, with at least 10,000 Maryland 
employees, can provide medical care for those employees only by 
accepting continuing “responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis” 
with the attendant “demands on its assets,” i.e., by having a plan.  For a 
firm like Wal-Mart, the provision of ongoing medical benefits “by 
nature” implies the existence of a plan within the meaning of ERISA.  
Consequently, the Maryland Act refers to such a plan when it defines 
and regulates “health insurance costs.” 
In short, the concept of “nonplan” medical expenditures by an 
employer like Wal-Mart is unpersuasive under ERISA’s statutory 
terminology, the relevant regulations interpreting that terminology, and 
the Supreme Court case that the Maryland Attorney General himself 
cites as authoritative. 
Third, the Maryland Act requires Wal-Mart to monitor continually 
its health care outlays and to report annually the level of those outlays 
as a percentage of Wal-Mart’s Maryland payroll.49  Unless Wal-Mart 
makes absolutely no health care expenditures for its Maryland 
employees and pays the entire eight percent of payroll to the Maryland 
Fair Share Health Care Fund, Wal-Mart’s obligations under the Act 
 
 46 Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 3. 
 47 Id. at 11. 
 48 Id. at 12. 
 49 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 107 
(West 2006)). 
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must be determined with reference to every “plan, fund or program” 
Wal-Mart maintains for its workforce.  Even if an employer like Wal-
Mart can make contingent, one-time “nonplan” medical outlays for its 
employees (a premise of which I am skeptical), the employer’s 
obligation under the Maryland Act is determined by a calculation that 
offsets against eight percent of payroll any outlays to the plans under 
which Wal-Mart provides employee medical coverage. 
 Finally, even if the Attorney General correctly reads the Act as 
not referring to the covered employer’s medical plans for its employees, 
the Act in the alternative has a “connection with” such plans since, as 
just observed, the employer’s liability under the Act can only be 
assessed by comparing eight percent of the employer’s Maryland 
payroll with the employer’s outlays under any medical plans the 
employer maintains for its Maryland employees. 
To summarize: Under the initial, expansive approach to Section 
514(a) and its “relate to” clause announced in Shaw, the Maryland Act 
is ERISA-preempted for two reasons.  The Act is preempted since it 
refers to employers’ health care outlays pursuant to their ERISA-
regulated medical plans.  Moreover, the Act, on its face, connects with 
employers’ ERISA-regulated medical plans.  The health care 
expenditures regulated by the Maryland Act necessarily entail such 
plans while the employer’s obligations under the Act can be ascertained 
only by considering the covered employer’s payments pursuant to such 
plans. 
 
B.     Travelers 
 
Ultimately, the Court’s original, Shaw-based approach to Section 
514(a) points to ERISA preemption without discernible limit.  Justice 
Scalia captured the core of the problem when he noted that “as many a 
curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything 
else.”50  From that vantage, the statutory term “relate to,” unless 
somehow cabined, is virtually limitless and Section 514(a) consequently 
preempts whatever it touches: An employer’s health care plan which 
refuses to pay rent to its landlord can plausibly resist eviction on the 
ground that, in this context, the state eviction statute relates to an 
ERISA-governed plan.  This is a result most would consider 
unacceptable, though the Court’s expansive, Shaw-based case law 
points to such ERISA preemption without discernible limits.51 
 
 50 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 51 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 815-27. 
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Confronted with the problematic consequences of its initial, 
capacious approach to Section 514(a), the Supreme Court contracted its 
construction of Section 514(a).  The critical decision in the retreat from 
the broad Shaw standard was New York State Conference of Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.52  Under this more 
restrained approach to Section 514(a) and its “relate to” language, 
ERISA still preempts the Maryland Act because the Act impacts, 
directly and acutely, upon the structure and administration of the 
covered employer’s medical plans. 
Travelers involved an ERISA preemption challenge to New York 
State’s regulatory scheme, imposing upon hospital patients surcharges 
for their respective hospital stays.  The surcharges varied depending 
upon the source of payment for the hospitalization.  If a hospitalization 
was financed by Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance, no surcharge was 
added to the bill for the hospital stay.  If, on the other hand, a self-
funded employer plan paid for the hospitalization from the employer’s 
own assets, a surcharge applied to the hospital’s fees.  Similarly, if 
privately-purchased or employer-supplied commercial insurance paid 
for a New York hospitalization, a surcharge applied to the hospital’s 
fees.  Likewise, if the patient himself paid for his hospitalization from 
his own resources, a surcharge was added to the patient’s bill. 
The evident economic effect of the New York regulation was to 
incent employers maintaining medical coverage for their employees to 
use Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance (rather than commercial insurance 
or self-funding) to avoid the hospital surcharges. 
Given the breadth of ERISA preemption under the Shaw line of 
cases, it is unsurprising that the Second Circuit struck the surcharge 
scheme as unacceptably “relat[ing] to” employers’ ERISA-regulated 
medical plans.53  However, the Supreme Court reversed and sustained 
the New York surcharge scheme in a way which, decisively albeit not 
openly, departed from the Court’s prior case law under Section 514(a). 
Many of the Shaw-based preemption decisions, the Travelers Court 
stated, “pre-empted state laws that mandated employee benefit 
structures or their administration.”54  In contrast, the New York hospital 
surcharge scheme was merely “[a]n indirect economic influence”55 on 
the choice made by ERISA-regulated medical plans, i.e., to self-fund, to 
use commercial insurance, or to purchase Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
coverage.  Moreover, Congress did not intend for ERISA “to displace 
 
 52 514 U.S. 645 (1995); see also Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed 
Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 488 (2003) 
(“In 1995, after years of criticism of its broad preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court scaled 
back ERISA’s preemptive effect in [Travelers].”). 
 53 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1993).  
 54 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658. 
 55 Id. at 659. 
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general health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of 
local concern.”56  And, the Travelers Court continued, preemption 
doctrine has traditionally started from the “presumption that Congress 
does not intend to supplant state law.”57  From these premises, the 
Travelers Court sustained the New York surcharge scheme as that 
scheme applied to ERISA-regulated welfare arrangements, that is, to 
employers’ medical plans for their employees. 
Had the Travelers Court been writing on a blank slate, none of this 
would have been remarkable.  However, in light of the Shaw line of 
cases, this approach to Section 514(a) and its “relate to” clause was 
remarkable indeed—though the Court itself did not acknowledge fully 
the extent to which Travelers represents a break from the cases which 
preceded it.  While the Court did not advertise Travelers as departing 
from Shaw and its progeny, the cases tell a different story.  Since 
Travelers, the Court has been far more likely than before to sustain state 
laws challenged as ERISA-preempted.58 
As I suggest below,59 the Court’s more restrained approach to 
Section 514(a) under Travelers is not wholly persuasive, given the text 
and structure of Section 514.  However, for the Maryland Act, the 
critical point is that, even under this more restrained understanding of 
ERISA preemption, Section 514(a) preempts the Act.  For these 
purposes, the key post-Travelers decision is Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,60 a 
decision on which Judge Motz relied heavily and, I think, 
persuasively.61  Egelhoff indicates that, even after Travelers, Section 
514(a) carries enormous preemptive force as to state laws like the Act 
that affect the benefits provided by ERISA-regulated welfare 
arrangements and that impair the nationally uniform administration of 
such welfare arrangements. 
In Egelhoff, the U.S. Supreme Court struck on ERISA preemption 
grounds a Washington State law stating that divorce revokes any 
outstanding beneficiary designation of a former spouse as to non-
probate property.  Mr. Egelhoff was an employee of Boeing, which 
provided life insurance coverage for Boeing employees’ designated 
 
 56 Id. at 661 (citation omitted). 
 57 Id. at 654. 
 58 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 827-39.  For discussion of later post-Travelers cases, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights—The Sequel, 635 N.Y.U. REV. 
EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-1 (2005) [hereinafter Zelinksy, Sequel]; Edward 
A. Zelinsky, Against A Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL. REV. 443 (2003) 
[hereinafter Zelinsky, Against]; Edward A. Zelinsky, Pegram and Preemption: Patients’ Rights 
and the Case for Doing Nothing, 88 TAX NOTES 1053 (2000) [hereinafter Zelinksy, Pegram]. 
 59 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 60 532 U.S. 141 (2001).  For discussion of Egelhoff, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, 
ERISA Preemption and the Conundrum of the ‘Relate To’ Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917 (2001). 
 61 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 490 (D. Md. 
2006). 
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beneficiaries.  Like an employer’s medical coverage for its employees, 
this type of employer-provided death benefit constitutes an ERISA-
regulated welfare plan.62  Mr. Egelhoff divorced his spouse who had 
previously been named as the beneficiary of his Boeing-provided life 
insurance.  Mr. Egelhoff then died without changing this designation.  
Consequently, the former Mrs. Egelhoff received the life insurance 
proceeds pursuant to her deceased husband’s pre-divorce designation. 
Mr. Egelhoff’s children from a prior marriage subsequently sued to 
obtain the insurance proceeds from the former Mrs. Egelhoff.  The 
Egelhoff children invoked the Washington State statute providing that 
divorce revokes any beneficiary designation of the now former but 
previously-designated spouse.  Mrs. Egelhoff defended against the 
claim of her former husband’s children by asserting that Section 514(a) 
preempts the Washington statute as to Boeing’s ERISA-regulated life 
insurance plan for Boeing employees, thus leaving the pre-divorce 
beneficiary designation in effect. 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the former Mrs. Egelhoff that 
Section 514(a) preempts the Washington statute as it applies to 
employer-provided plans governed by ERISA.  The Washington statute, 
the Egelhoff Court observed, impermissibly intrudes upon “an area of 
core ERISA concern,”63 namely, the primacy of plan documents.  Since 
Mrs. Egelhoff remained the designated beneficiary pursuant to the 
Boeing plan documents, Washington State was preempted from 
unsettling that designation, thereby forcing Boeing, as plan 
administrator, to look outside the plan documentation to determine the 
rightful recipient of Mr. Egelhoff’s insured death benefit. 
By displacing the otherwise valid designation of the former Mrs. 
Egelhoff, the Washington statute purports to govern “the payment of 
benefits, a central matter of plan administration.”64  Thus, in Egelhoff 
the Court reiterated that, as Travelers had indicated earlier, “state laws 
that mandate[] employee benefit structures or their administration”65 run 
afoul of Section 514(a). 
Moreover, the Egelhoff Court declared, the Washington statute 
“interferes with nationally uniform plan administration”66 by 
prescribing a different rule for one state (divorce revokes beneficiary 
designation) than prevails in other states (no such revocation on 
 
 62 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (2000)) (ERISA-
regulated welfare plans include “any plan, fund, or program” providing “death . . . benefits” 
“through the purchase insurance or otherwise[.]”). 
 63 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147. 
 64 Id. at 148. 
 65 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 658 (1995). 
 66 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.  
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divorce).  As national uniformity is an important objective of ERISA in 
general and Section 514 in particular, the Court reasoned, this 
interference further indicates that the Washington law impermissibly 
“relate[s] to” an ERISA plan and, in the context of such a plan, is 
preempted by Section 514(a). 
Egelhoff demonstrates that, in particular cases, ERISA preemption 
retains potency even under the more restrained Travelers approach to 
Section 514(a) and its “relate to” clause.  Indeed, Egelhoff indicates that 
the Maryland Act is preempted under Travelers: If Section 514(a) 
forbids Washington State from instructing an ERISA-regulated plan to 
whom the plan must pay welfare benefits (or not), Maryland cannot 
impose upon an ERISA-regulated plan the minimum level of welfare 
benefits which the plan must pay.  In both instances, the state is 
“mandat[ing] employee benefit structures or their administration.”  For 
Maryland to force an employer to spend at least eight percent of its total 
payroll on medical care is a classic instance of a state “mandat[ing an] 
employee benefit structure” in violation of Section 514(a) and its rule of 
preemption.  
In addition, the Maryland Act, like the Washington statute, 
interferes with national uniformity in plan administration by forcing an 
interstate employer covered by the Act (i.e., Wal-Mart) to adopt policies 
in Maryland it need not adopt in other states.  This again indicates the 
incompatibility between the Act and Section 514(a) as the Court has 
construed that section in Travelers and Egelhoff. 
Maryland’s Attorney General argues otherwise, contending that the 
Act “imposes no requirements that would interfere with uniform 
nationwide plan management or set up contradictory requirements 
between states.”67  This contention is unpersuasive as the Act requires 
Wal-Mart to do in Maryland something Wal-Mart need do in no other 
state, specifically, spend a minimum percentage of its total payroll costs 
on medical care.  As Judge Motz correctly observed, the Maryland “Act 
creates health care spending requirements that are not applicable in 
most other jurisdictions.”68 
Alternatively, Maryland could retort that the Act is less like the 
Washington statute struck in Egelhoff and more like the New York 
hospital surcharge scheme sustained in Travelers, the kind of “general 
health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local 
concern . . . .”69  The problem with this retort is that the Maryland Act is 
not like the New York hospital surcharge scheme, a generally-
applicable regulation that impacted across-the-board upon all hospital 
patients.  Rather, the Act is a narrowly-targeted regulation of 
 
 67 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 4. 
 68 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 494 (D. Md. 2006). 
 69 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661. 
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employers’ ERISA-governed medical plans—indeed, of a single 
employer’s ERISA-governed medical plans. 
The New York regulation sustained in Travelers levied a hospital 
surcharge even if the hospitalized patient paid for his own stay or had 
private insurance funding that hospital stay.  The New York regulation 
was thus a genuinely general medical regulation, applying broadly to all 
hospitalized patients, not just to patients covered by employers’ ERISA-
regulated plans.  The other examples of general health regulation 
invoked in Travelers—hospital “[q]uality control and workplace 
regulation”70—are similarly broad in their coverage and effect, applying 
to all hospitals and affecting all patients, not just to those patients 
participating in their employers’ ERISA-regulated health plans. 
The Maryland Act, by comparison, is targeted specifically at 
employer-provided medical plans, not at a broad class of health care 
consumers or providers.  The Maryland Act represents no mere 
“indirect economic influence,” which increases costs for every 
consumer of medical care including employers’ medical plans.  Rather, 
the evident purpose of the Act is a direct, focused financial impact on 
the covered employer and its ERISA-regulated medical plan, i.e., to 
force an increase in medical outlays to an eight percent minimum of 
payroll. 
Also instructive in this context is the Supreme Court’s post-
Travelers decision in Pegram v. Herdrich.71  In Pegram, the Court 
observed that states’ general medical malpractice liability laws are not 
ERISA-preempted when a medical mistake is made by a treating 
physician working for an employer-engaged HMO.  This observation is 
fully consistent with the principle established in Travelers that “general 
health care regulation” does not run afoul of Section 514. 
Suppose, in contrast, that Maryland were to adopt a state tort 
statute establishing malpractice liability only for doctors employed by 
ERISA-governed plans.  Such a targeted law would not be protected 
from ERISA preemption as a general health regulation since it would 
not be general.  The same is true of the Maryland Act. 
It is, in short, unpersuasive to denominate the Maryland Act as a 
general health regulation when it is actually a targeted regulation of 
employers’ (indeed, a single employer’s) ERISA-governed medical 
plans.  Even under the more restrained Travelers approach to Section 
514(a), ERISA precludes states from mandating employer-provided 
benefit levels in this fashion. 
Finally, some supporters of the Act, including Maryland’s 
Attorney General, focus upon the covered employer’s potential payment 
to the Fund and, from that focus, characterize the Act as a tax law with 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 530 U.S. 211 (2000).  For a discussion of Pegram, see Zelinsky, Pegram, supra note 58. 
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only indirect impact on Wal-Mart’s ERISA-regulated medical plans.72  
However, for four reasons, that characterization does not preserve the 
Act from preemption under Travelers.  First, as a statutory matter, state 
tax laws as such are not protected from ERISA preemption.  Only laws 
relative to insurance, banking, and securities as well as “generally 
applicable criminal law[s]” are shielded statutorily from such 
preemption.73  Thus, for ERISA preemption purposes, there is no 
talismanic effect from labeling a state statute as a tax law. 
Second, the levy assessed by the Act, i.e., the payment to the Fund, 
is not a revenue-raising measure of general applicability, but is instead a 
narrowly-targeted penalty designed to force Wal-Mart to comply with 
Maryland’s statutorily-imposed “benefit structure[],”74 namely, medical 
outlays of at least eight percent of total payroll.  It is unconvincing for 
ERISA preemption purposes to characterize that penalty as a tax, given 
the penalty’s narrow focus and evident purpose, namely, to coerce Wal-
Mart into increasing its health care outlays.  Third, it is equally difficult 
to see how the “tax” imposed by the Act can be labeled as “indirect” in 
its impact upon Wal-Mart’s medical plans for its employees.  Rather, 
that “tax” is specifically aimed at such plans and the level of health care 
coverage they provide. 
Finally, under Travelers, even a law with “indirect” effect may 
have sufficiently harsh impact to be ERISA-preempted.  In this 
connection, the Travelers Court specifically observed “that a state law 
might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or 
otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of 
substantive coverage . . . .”75  “[S]uch a state law,” the Court noted, 
“might indeed be pre-empted under Section 514.”76  Even if the Act is 
properly characterized as a tax with only indirect effects on ERISA 
plans (a characterization of which I am skeptical), the economic effect 
of the Act and of the tax it imposes is indeed acute.  The tax forces Wal-
Mart to embrace Maryland’s substantive standard for health care 
coverage, i.e., a minimum outlay of eight percent of total payroll. 
 
 72 Hakim et al., supra note 15 (quoting Jennifer Sung that New York’s proposed version of 
the Maryland Act “requires employers to pay a tax to the state or they can pay less tax to the state 
if they spend a certain amount on employee health care.  It doesn’t have any direct relation to 
ERISA . . . .”); see also Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 3 (characterizing the Act as 
“a revenue raising measure rather than a regulation of employers”); Karen Setze, Is Maryland’s 
‘Wal-Mart Bill’ A Tax?, Apr. 5, 2006, ST. TAX TODAY, at 65-11 (quoting attorney Marc I. 
Machiz that the Act establishes “a tax on employers—admittedly a very limited tax—to fund 
uninsured health care through the Medicaid program . . . .”). 
 73 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §§ 514(b)(2)(A), 514(b)(4), 
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)). 
 74 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658. 
 75 Id. at 668. 
 76 Id. 
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Consider in this context the marginal rate of the “tax” imposed by 
the Act: 100 percent.  For each dollar that Wal-Mart’s medical outlays 
fall below the minimum threshold of eight percent of payroll, Wal-Mart 
must pay a dollar to the Fund.  This dollar-for-dollar scheme is 
evidently designed to coerce Wal-Mart into raising its medical 
expenditures for its Maryland employees until Wal-Mart attains the 
statutory threshold.  Even under the more restrained approach of 
Travelers, the Act, by virtue of its coercive nature, is ERISA-
preempted, even if the Act is denominated as an indirect tax law. 
In the context of the claim that the Act establishes an indirect tax 
that survives ERISA preemption, the Court’s post-Travelers decision in 
De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund77 is 
instructive.  In De Buono, a self-insured ERISA welfare plan “own[ed] 
and operate[d] three medical centers . . . that provide[d] medical, dental 
and other health care benefits.”78  The plan challenged on ERISA 
preemption grounds a New York tax imposed “on gross receipts for 
patient services at hospitals, residential health care facilities, and 
diagnostic and treatment centers.”79 
Critical to the De Buono Court’s rejection of this preemption 
challenge was the “general applicability”80 of the challenged tax: the tax 
applied to all New York medical facilities, not just to those facilities 
operated by ERISA plans.  Moreover, the tax statute questioned in De 
Buono did not “contain . . . provisions that expressly refer to . . . ERISA 
plans.”81 
In contrast, the Act, assuming it is a tax law, is a different kind of 
tax law.  The Act only applies with reference to the covered employer’s 
ERISA plans for employee health care and is only triggered by the 
employer’s failure to contribute to such plans the statutory minimum of 
payroll decreed by the Act.  Consequently, the Act is not a tax law of 
“general applicability,” raising funds neutrally from a broad swath of 
health care providers.  Rather, the Act is a targeted penalty statute that 
only assesses liability with reference to an employer’s contributions to 
its ERISA-regulated medical plans for its employees.  And, in the final 
analysis, the Act and its dollar-for-dollar tax are designed to force Wal-
Mart to adopt Maryland’s “scheme of substantive coverage,”82 
specifically, a minimum health care outlay of eight percent of total 
payroll. 
 
 77 520 U.S. 806 (1997). 
 78 Id. at 810. 
 79 Id. at 809-10. 
 80 Id. at 815. 
 81 Id.  
 82 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 668 (1995). 
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In short, even under the more relaxed preemption standards 
announced in Travelers,83 the Act, even if denominated a tax law with 
only indirect effect, unacceptably coerces the covered employer as to 
the substance of the employer’s welfare plans’ coverage.84 
In summary, under the more restrained interpretation of Section 
514(a) announced in Travelers and its progeny including Egelhoff, 
ERISA preempts the Maryland Act since the Act both mandates the 
level of Wal-Mart’s medical outlays and impairs national uniformity in 
the administration of Wal-Mart’s medical plans.  The impact of the Act 
on Wal-Mart’s medical plans is direct and acute. 
Judge Motz was understandably reluctant to discern a sharp break 
between the Supreme Court’s pre- and post-Travelers cases when the 
Court itself has been reluctant to acknowledge such a break.85  
Nevertheless, Judge Motz’s reading of Travelers and its progeny is the 
same as that advanced by myself and others who do see a significant 
difference between the Shaw and the Travelers approaches to ERISA 
preemption.  Even under the more relaxed Travelers standard, ERISA 
preempts any state law “mandating that an employer provide a certain 
type or monetary level of welfare benefits in an ERISA plan.”86  And 
this, Judge Motz correctly observed, is exactly what the Maryland Act 
does: 
The Act is not merely tangentially related to ERISA plans but is 
focused upon them.  Indeed, as the legislative history makes clear, 
the Fair Share Act is targeted directly at the ERISA plan of a 
particular employer.  Moreover, the economic effect of the Fair 
Share Act upon Wal-Mart’s ERISA plan could not be more direct: it 
would require Wal-Mart to increase its health care benefits for 
Maryland employees and to administer its plan in such a fashion as 




 83 A similar conclusion emerges under the Shaw approach to ERISA preemption.  Even if the 
Maryland Act is viewed as a tax law with only indirect impact, the tax imposed, i.e., the required 
payment to the Fund, is the difference between the covered employer’s statutorily-required 
outlays for health care and its actual outlays.  Thus, labeling the Act (or any similar law) as a tax 
law with indirect impact does not avoid the central issue under Shaw: The Act and the tax it 
imposes both refer to and are connected with the covered employer’s payments (or lack thereof) 
to the employer’s ERISA-regulated welfare plan for employees’ medical coverage.  Under Shaw, 
such reference and connection result in preemption of the Act per Section 514. 
 84 Judge Motz’s analysis of the Act is similar: “[T]he intended effect of the Act is to force 
Wal-Mart to increase its contribution to its health benefit plan, which is an ERISA plan, and the 
actual effect of the Act will be to coerce Wal-Mart into doing so.”  Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. 
Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006). 
 85 Id. at 495 (“[T]his court has no authority to disregard Supreme Court precedent on the 
basis of the prediction that the Court would overrule its decisions.”). 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 496. 
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C.     Reasoned Textualism 
 
Travelers and its progeny represent an important effort by the 
Court to reform the overly-expansive Shaw-based approach to ERISA 
preemption, albeit a reform effort the Court itself has so far declined to 
acknowledge fully.  Nevertheless, Travelers, while preferable to the 
capacious Shaw-based approach to Section 514, is itself not a persuasive 
construction of that provision.  A better approach to Section 514 can be 
denoted “reasoned textualism,”88 the effort to make the statute workable 
while engaging the statutory text respectfully.  A reasoned textualist 
understanding of Section 514(a) again points to preemption of the 
Maryland Act since the Act intrudes upon employers’ autonomy as to 
medical plan participation and funding, topics ERISA reserves for 
employer discretion. 
Fundamental to the interpretation of ERISA Section 514(a) is 
ERISA Section 514(b), which exempts from Section 514(a) states’ 
insurance, banking, and securities laws,89 as well as “generally 
applicable criminal law[s].”90  These exemptions belie the post-
Travelers notion, advanced by Justices Scalia,91 Ginsburg,92 Breyer,93 
and Stevens,94 that Section 514(a) merely codifies traditional 
preemption doctrine, which is quite solicitous of state law.  If that is so, 
from what are these exempted state laws exempt?95  And why would 
Congress have enacted a provision—ERISA Section 514(a)—which 
redundantly pronounced preemption doctrine that the Court would have 
applied anyway? 
More plausibly, the exemptions of Section 514(b) are read as 
furnishing relief from the tougher preemption scrutiny otherwise 
imposed by Section 514(a).96 
 
 88 Zelinsky, supra note 21. 
 89 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 514(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)). 
 90 ERISA § 514(b)(4). 
 91 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 365-
66 (1997); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001). 
 92 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 356-66; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152. 
 93 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 153-61. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 832. 
 96 Of similar import to the construction of Section 514 is what has come to be known as “the 
deemer clause,” ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B).  This provision precludes states from deeming ERISA 
plans to be insurance companies.  The evident purpose of this provision is to limit the insurance 
exemption of Section 514(b) to “true” insurance companies, thereby preventing states from 
intruding their insurance laws too far at the expense of ERISA.  Again, this indicates that there is 
something from which Section 514(b) exempts state insurance laws, i.e., more searching 
preemption scrutiny under Section 514(a).  The deemer clause cabins the insurance exemption. 
Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 813.  The deemer clause proves important when analyzing the 
Maryland Act as a purported regulation of insurance.  See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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For those who believe in legislative history, the congressional 
hoopla surrounding the adoption of Section 514(a) is equally hard to 
reconcile with the view that that section embodies nothing more than 
normal preemption doctrine.  In the House of Representatives, a leading 
sponsor of ERISA, Congressman John Dent, effusively declared that 
Section 514 “is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation.”97  
It is difficult to understand that encomium if Section 514(a) is nothing 
more than a redundant statement of preemption doctrine the Court 
would apply anyway. 
Consequently, the critical task in the construction of Section 514(a) 
is to give content to the higher than usual level of preemption scrutiny 
mandated by Section 514(a) without succumbing to the potential 
indeterminacy of the phrase “relate to.”  In simplest terms, the task is to 
find a middle way under which Section 514(a) is neither limitless (as it 
is under Shaw) nor redundant (as it is under the four justices’ 
conception of Travelers).  The best resolution of this task is to interpret 
Section 514(a) as reversing the traditional presumption against 
preemption by establishing a statutory presumption for such 
preemption.  Without surrendering to the potential indeterminacy of the 
“relate to” clause, this approach gives content to Section 514(a), 
mandating in the ERISA context a more searching preemption inquiry 
than normal.  This approach also preserves the structure of ERISA, 
providing that there is something—the presumption for preemption 
established in Section 514(a)—from which state banking, insurance, 
securities, and criminal laws are exempted by Section 514(b). 
The second component of the reasoned textualist approach to 
Section 514(a) stems from the much-discussed disparity in the structure 
of ERISA vis-a-vis pension and welfare plans.  As has been frequently 
noted,98 ERISA, while it governs both pension and welfare plans, 
governs them quite differently.  ERISA’s provisions pertaining to 
disclosure and reporting,99 fiduciary responsibility,100 and 
administration and enforcement101 apply to pension102 and welfare plans 
 
 97 JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 268 (2004). 
 98 LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND 
WELFARE BENEFITS 91-92 (2004) (discussing “ERISA’s lack of substantive regulation” of 
welfare plans); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 
176-78 (3d ed. 2000) (“The result of this statutory latticework is that only three parts of ERISA’s 
Title I do apply to welfare benefit plans . . . .”); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by 
“Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens and Great-West, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1323-24 (2003) (noting that “ERISA excused” welfare plans from such 
“substantive rules” as “vesting, anti-reduction, and funding rules” which apply to pension plans). 
 99 ERISA §§ 101-111. 
 100 Id. §§ 401-414. 
 101 Id. §§ 501-514. 
 102 ERISA’s definition of pensions includes profit sharing plans such as Section 401(k) 
arrangements.  See id. § 3(2)(B) (providing that any plan which “results in a deferral of income” 
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alike.  However, for pensions, ERISA provides elaborate rules as to 
funding103 and as to participation and vesting.104  In contrast, ERISA is 
silent on these subjects relative to welfare plans.  Under the normal 
precepts of preemption, the presence in ERISA of such substantive 
regulation for pensions but not for welfare plans suggests greater scope 
for state regulation of such welfare plans since there is no federal 
regulation occupying the field. 
However, a better reading of the statute105 infers from Section 514 
and the structure of ERISA a zone of employer autonomy in the design 
and operation of employers’ welfare plans.  As to the topics falling 
inside this zone, employers, while constrained vis-a-vis pension plans, 
can determine the content of their welfare plans free of regulation.  
Under this approach, when a state law impacting employers’ welfare 
plans is challenged as ERISA-preempted, the appropriate inquiry is 
whether the state law intrudes upon a subject on which ERISA 
affirmatively regulates pensions.  If so, there is a presumption that the 
challenged state law is preempted as intruding upon the employer’s 
discretionary zone of welfare plan autonomy.  Thus, the scope of 
ERISA’s pension regulation determines the zone of autonomy for 
welfare plans. 
For present purposes, my goal is not to persuade the reader that the 
reasoned textualist perspective on Section 514(a) is correct,106 but to 
observe that under this approach also, as under the Shaw and Travelers 
approaches, Section 514(a) preempts the Maryland Act.  The Act, by 
mandating a minimum health care outlay of eight percent of total 
payroll, pressures Wal-Mart to extend employer-provided health care 
participation to more of Wal-Mart’s employees.107  This attempt to 
expand employee participation in employer-sponsored medical care 
intrudes upon an area where, as a textual matter, ERISA creates a zone 
 
is a pension plan for ERISA purposes). 
 103 Id. §§ 301-306. 
 104 Id. §§ 201-211. 
 105 See Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 839-41. 
 106 Though I believe it is.  See id.; Zelinsky, supra note 60. 
 107 Wal-Mart might respond to the Act in other ways.  For example, Wal-Mart might decrease 
its Maryland payroll or employment (or both) or might increase its medical coverage for existing 
(or fewer) participants.  Any of these approaches (or some combination of them) could place 
Wal-Mart outside the coverage of the Act (since Wal-Mart’s Maryland employment would drop 
below the 10,000 statutory threshold) or could bring Wal-Mart into compliance with the Act (by 
bringing Wal-Mart’s medical outlays to eight percent of payroll).  Those possibilities, which 
suggest that the Act is poorly designed, do not alter the basic observation in the text, that the Act 
pressures Wal-Mart to increase medical plan participation, even though Wal-Mart might respond 
to that pressure in other ways.  For a discussion of the possibility that Wal-Mart could respond to 
the Act by decreasing Maryland employment and medical coverage, see discussion infra Part 
IV.B. 
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of employer autonomy since ERISA mandates minimum participation 
rules for pensions108 but not for welfare arrangements. 
Similarly, the Maryland Act pressures the covered employer to 
increase its funding for employees’ medical care or to persist in funding 
above the statutory requirement.  Funding too is an area where ERISA 
creates for employers a zone of welfare plan autonomy since ERISA 
regulates pension funding,109 but not the financing of welfare plans.  
Maryland cannot overcome the presumption that its Act is preempted 
since the Act intrudes upon two topics—participation and funding—
where ERISA, as a textual matter, provides detailed regulation of 
pensions but is best construed as reserving for employers a zone of 
welfare plan discretion. 
Instructive in this context is Judge Motz’s observation that “no 
rational employer would choose to pay”110 to Maryland’s Fair Share 
Health Care Fund.  Rather, confronted with the “Hobson’s choice”111 
created by the Act, Wal-Mart is forced by the Act to “increas[e] its 
employees’ benefits,”112 i.e., to increase the participation in and/or the 
funding of Wal-Mart’s medical care plans. 
In short, a reasoned textualist approach to Section 514(a) and 
ERISA preemption leads to the conclusion that the Maryland Act is 
incompatible with the ERISA-created zone of welfare plan autonomy.  
The Act intrudes upon employers’ decisions as to participation in, and 
the funding of, their medical arrangements for their employees.  ERISA 
is best understood as creating a presumption for preemption, a 
presumption confirmed by the Maryland Act’s impact upon areas— 
welfare plan participation and funding—which ERISA reserves for 
employer discretion. 
 
D.     The Insurance Exemption 
 
As previously observed,113 the Act’s definition of “health insurance 
costs” is inelegant.  Included within that definition are covered 
employers’ self-funded health care outlays from the employers’ own 
resources.  It is possible that the drafters of the Act used the term 
“insurance costs” inadvisably or colloquially when what they really 
meant instead was the totality of the covered employers’ medical-
related expenses. 
 
 108 See ERISA § 202.  A parallel statutory provision is I.R.C. § 410(a). 
 109 See ERISA §§ 301-308, 1081-1086.  A parallel statutory provision is I.R.C. § 412. 
 110 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006). 
 111 Id. at 497. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
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It is, however, also possible that something subtler is involved in 
the Act’s use of the imprecise label “health insurance costs” to describe 
the entirety of employers’ medical expenditures including expenditures 
pursuant to self-funded plans.  The drafters of the Act, by characterizing 
the subject of the Act as medical insurance, may have sought for the Act 
the protection of ERISA Section 514(b)(2)(A) and its exemption for 
state insurance laws.  If so, the drafters missed their mark.  Despite the 
Act’s labeling of employers’ medical expenses as “health insurance 
costs,” the Act, by virtue of ERISA’s “deemer clause,”114 does not 
“regulate[] insurance” within the meaning of Section 514(b)(2)(A) since 
the Act covers employers’ ERISA-governed, self-funded plans, i.e., 
arrangements under which Wal-Mart pays all medical outlays from its 
own resources without purchasing medical insurance coverage from an 
insurance company.  Consequently, the Maryland Act is overly-broad 
and does not fall within the insurance exemption from Section 514(a). 
The deemer clause provides that no ERISA-governed plan may be 
“deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be 
engaged in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any 
State purporting to regulate” insurance entities.115  As the Supreme 
Court observed in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, because of the deemer 
clause: 
Self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as 
that regulation “relate[s] to” the plans.  State laws directed toward 
the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit 
plan but are not “saved” because they do not regulate insurance.  
State laws that directly regulate insurance are “saved” but do not 
reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not 
be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in 
the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws. 116 
The Maryland Act does precisely what the deemer clause forbids: 
regulate a covered employer’s self-funded medical plan under the guise 
of insurance regulation.  Specifically, the Act counts employers’ self-
funded health outlays toward the required eight percent minimum of 
payroll and mandates a payment to the Fund if those self-financed 
outlays fail the statutory minimum. 
Recall in this context the Act’s definitions of “health insurance 
costs.”117  These definitions are not limited to health insurance 
premiums.  Rather, the definitions count against the eight percent 
 
 114 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B).  For background on the deemer clause, see FROLIK & MOORE, 
supra note 98, at 242; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 98, at 548; WOOTEN, supra note 97, at 
236, 258-59, 281-82. 
 115 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B). 
 116 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990). 
 117 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
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minimum118 any “health care” outlay that is deductible by the employer 
for federal income tax purposes as well as any employer “payments” for 
any “health benefits” as defined in Section 213(d) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  None of these qualifying outlays need be for insurance 
or otherwise have anything to do with insurers or insurance. 
Thus, if Wal-Mart eschews all forms of medical insurance and 
pays all of its employees’ medical expenses from Wal-Mart’s general 
assets, the Act may deem Wal-Mart’s self-funded plans inadequate and 
consequently impose upon Wal-Mart a liability equal to the difference 
between the eight percent statutory minimum and the amount of Wal-
Mart’s payments to Wal-Mart’s self-funded medical plans.  Under the 
structure of ERISA Section 514, the Maryland Act could apply to self-
funded plans in this fashion only if such plans are deemed to be in the 
business of insurance, a result the deemer clause forbids.  
 Confirming this conclusion is Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, 
Inc. v. Miller119 in which the Supreme Court rejected an ERISA 
preemption challenge to Kentucky’s “any willing provider” statute.  
Kentucky’s statute, like similar laws in other states, requires every 
Kentucky HMO and every non-ERISA medical plan120 to reimburse for 
the medical services furnished by any doctor or other medical provider 
who agrees to accept the HMO’s or plan’s published fee schedule.  The 
Kentucky statute does not apply to any self-funded, ERISA-governed 
plan. 
In the face of an ERISA preemption challenge, the Court 
unanimously upheld the Kentucky “any willing provider” law as a 
regulation of insurance, protected from preemption by the insurance 
exemption of Section 514(b).  Important for the Maryland Act is the fact 
that the Kentucky statute does not apply to self-funded plans regulated 
by ERISA.121  By limiting itself to true insurance entities such as HMOs 
and to plans outside the scope of ERISA coverage, the Kentucky statute 
survived ERISA preemption as a bona fide regulation of insurance. 
Thus, Kentucky did what Maryland did not:122 enact a true 
insurance statute that keeps its distance from employers’ self-funded, 
ERISA-regulated medical plans.  By virtue of the deemer clause, only a 
law which, in this fashion, eschews regulation of employers’ self-
funded plans is a protected insurance law under Section 514(b)(2)(A).  
 
 118 Six percent for nonprofit employers. 
 119 538 U.S. 329 (2003); see Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58, at 1-9. 
 120 For these purposes, the most important plans not regulated by ERISA are church and 
government plans.  See ERISA §§ 4(b)(1), (2). 
 121 Kentucky Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1. 
 122 A variant of this observation is that Hawaii did what Maryland did not: obtain an 
amendment to Section 514 to remove from the scope of ERISA preemption a state statute that 
would otherwise be ERISA-preempted.  See ERISA § 514(b)(5). 
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In contrast, the Act regulates Wal-Mart’s self-funded plans by requiring 
that they satisfy the eight percent of payroll test. 
In sum, if the Act’s inelegant reference to “health insurance costs” 
is a deliberate effort to claim the insurance-related protection from 
preemption afforded by Section 514(b)(2)(A), that effort fails because 
of the deemer clause and the Act’s regulation of covered employers’ 
self-funded medical outlays, regulation the deemer clause forbids. 
 
E.     Summary 
 
As a matter of positive law, the Act is preempted by virtue of 
ERISA Section 514(a).123  Under the original, capacious construction of 
Section 514(a) initially embraced by the Court in Shaw and in Shaw’s 
progeny including Greater Washington Board of Trade, the Maryland 
Act “relate[s] to” covered employers’ ERISA-regulated health plans by 
referring to the outlays of such plans and by having a connection with 
such plans.  Under the more restricted construction of Section 514(a) 
advanced in Travelers and its offspring including Egelhoff, the 
Maryland Act is similarly ERISA-preempted by virtue of the Act’s 
effort to mandate the level of covered employers’ medical outlays and 
the Act’s impairment of nationally uniform welfare plan administration. 
If Section 514(a) is interpreted through the reasoned textualist 
approach I favor, the Act is, again, preempted as a regulation of the 
participation in and the funding of covered employers’ welfare plans.  
From the reasoned textualist vantage, Section 514(a) creates a 
presumption that the Act is ERISA-preempted insofar as the Act affects 
such welfare plans.  That presumption is confirmed by the Act’s 
intrusion upon the covered employers’ zone of welfare plan autonomy, 
a zone within which employers have discretion to determine who 
participates in their medical coverage and how that coverage is funded. 
By virtue of ERISA’s deemer clause, the Act is not saved from 
ERISA preemption as a regulation of insurance since the Act regulates 
covered employers’ self-funded medical outlays, declaring such outlays 
inadequate if they are less than eight percent of Wal-Mart’s Maryland 
payroll.  The deemer clause forbids such regulation. 
 
 123 Quite independently of the legal controversy surrounding ERISA Section 514(a), another 
preemption debate swirls around ERISA Section 502.  The Supreme Court has construed Section 
502 as severely limiting the remedies available to injured ERISA plaintiffs.  While the debate 
about the Supreme Court’s preemption approach to ERISA Section 502 is important, it has no 
direct relevance for the Maryland Act. 
  For commentary on the ERISA Section 502 preemption controversy, see LANGBEIN, supra 
note 98, at 770; Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58; Korobkin, supra note 52. 
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For all these reasons, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maryland decided correctly when it held the Maryland Wal-Mart Act to 
be ERISA-preempted.  The Fourth Circuit should affirm that decision. 
 
III.     SHOULD ERISA PREEMPT THE ACT? 
 
The conclusion that, as a matter of positive law, ERISA preempts 
the Maryland Act leads to the normative question: Should ERISA 
preempt the Act?  I answer this inquiry in the negative.  As a normative 
matter, ERISA should not preempt the Maryland Act or any similar 
state statute regulating employers’ medical plans.  I explain below my 
misgivings about the Maryland Act as a matter of policy.124  However, 
as problematic as the Act is in terms of policy, Maryland (or any other 
state) should be free to experiment with its own approach to employer-
provided health care. 
It is a truism of contemporary federalism that the states should 
serve as laboratories of experimentation.125  ERISA’s preemption of 
state law stops that experimentation by invalidating laws like the Act.  
Health care is today among the nation’s most urgent domestic concerns.  
To date, no one has convinced the American public that he has found 
the ultimate solution to the problems of controlling health care costs and 
of assuring access to such care.  Under the circumstances, medical care 
is the kind of topic where state-by-state experimentation is appropriate 
to determine what works and what does not.  Experimentation includes 
an acceptance of experiments that one considers inadvisable, as I think 
the Maryland Act is. 
The countervailing policy, stressed by the Egelhoff Court, is the 
perceived need for national uniformity in the administration of welfare 
plans.  For two reasons, I am, as a normative matter, not persuaded of 
the need for national standards that preclude experiments like the 
Maryland Act.  First, in other areas, corporations operating across state 
lines adjust to different states’ varied laws, e.g., local land use 
ordinances, individual states’ workers’ compensation systems.  There is 
no important distinction between these diverse laws, with which 
interstate corporations successfully cope, and a similarly pluralistic 
regime under which each state would formulate its own rules for health 
care.  Given the ability of interstate businesses to adapt to varied state 
laws in other contexts, it is difficult to see an insurmountable problem if 
 
 124 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 125 This celebrated metaphor comes from Justice Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).  For further elaboration of the value of state-by-state 
experimentation as to the regulation of medical care, see Zelinsky, Against, supra note 58; 
Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58. 
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interstate corporations must similarly adapt to different state laws on 
medical coverage. 
Indeed, interstate corporations that insure (rather than self-fund) 
their employees’ medical coverage already accommodate different state 
law regimes.  Such corporations routinely purchase policies which vary 
from state to state in light of each state’s idiosyncratic regulation of its 
own insurance industry and its products.  To illustrate these state-by-
state variations among medical insurance policies, Cogan, Hubbard, and 
Kessler observe that 
California requires insurance plans to cover both contraceptives and 
in-vitro fertilization; Virginia requires coverage of contraceptives but 
not in-vitro fertilization; and Florida, Indiana, and Pennsylvania 
require coverage of neither service.126 
These kinds of state-by-state variations in insurance coverage have 
caused no perceptible problems for interstate corporations purchasing 
insurance for their employees.  Interstate corporations could similarly 
adapt their non-insured, self-funded medical plans to different states’ 
respective regulations of those plans. 
Such state-by-state adaptation will impose some costs on interstate 
corporations, both procedurally (e.g., legal fees to comply with each 
state’s own regulatory scheme) and substantively (e.g., greater 
payments to covered employees in states which mandate more 
coverage).  However, if any particular corporation finds prohibitive the 
medical costs of operating in any state, that corporation has the same 
options for medical costs as the corporation does with respect to any 
other state-imposed costs, namely, to shift its operations elsewhere or to 
lobby for different state laws.  There is no need for a single, federally-
imposed standard. 
Second, concern about national uniformity as to welfare plans 
largely stems from a false analogy to pensions.  In light of employee 
mobility across state lines and the cumulative nature of pension 
entitlements, there is a strong conflict-of-laws argument for nationally 
uniform pension laws.  Different state rules for pensions would 
engender confusion and complexity as employees relocate across state 
lines, bringing with them pension entitlements earned elsewhere.  There 
is, however, no equivalent mobility-related problem for medical 
arrangements since, at any moment, an employee is covered by only one 
discrete set of medical benefits.  When the employee moves to another 
state, he does not take cumulative medical rights with him and thus does 
 
 126 JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, WEALTHY AND 
WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 44 (2005).  Cogan, Hubbard and Kessler 
take a dim view of these state-imposed requirements for medical insurance, arguing that they 
unacceptably increase the cost of such insurance. 
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not encounter any pension-type conflict-of-law problem as to his 
medical coverage. 
To illustrate this difference between cumulative pension and 
discrete medical rights, consider a theoretical world in which every state 
can promulgate its own vesting rules for pensions.  Suppose, for 
example, that in State A an employee has an immediately nonforfeitable 
right to any pension benefit he has earned, that the law of State B vests 
an employee in his accrued pension rights only after fifteen years of 
service with the sponsoring employer, and that State C’s rule is a 
particular form of graduated vesting, five percent additional vesting for 
each year of service, ending in full vesting at year twenty.  Assume 
further that, over the course of a decade, an employee works for an 
employer in State A, then in State B and, finally, in State C, accruing 
cumulative pension benefits in all three states.127 
Which vesting schedule or schedules apply to this employee and 
his cumulative pension benefit?  State A’s immediate schedule on the 
theory that State A is where his career began?  State C’s graduated 
vesting schedule on the theory that that is where the employee is now? 
When the employee moves from State A (where he was fully vested) to 
State B (where he is not vested at all), should this movement to State B 
unsettle the vesting the employee had previously earned in State A?  
Perhaps each state’s vesting rule should apply to the portion of the 
pension benefit earned in that particular state.  This is a theoretically 
tidy solution that will prove messy in practice for employees who are 
highly mobile during their careers and thus must keep track of the 
different pension rules controlling in the different states in which they 
have worked. 
In the face of these quandaries, a national approach to pension 
vesting is sensible since the employee can move from state-to-state 
without his pension rights being impaired or becoming unnecessarily 
complicated by conflicting state laws. 
A similar story can be told as to pension participation.  Suppose a 
world in which State A requires immediate pension participation for all 
employees, State B delays mandatory pension participation until the 
employee’s completion of the tenth year of service with the employer, 
and State C requires the employee’s inclusion in the employer’s pension 
plan only upon his fifth year of employment.  What happens in this 
world as the employee moves from A to B to C?  Does he stay in the 
pension while living in B and C on the theory that his right of 
immediate participation from State A carries over to other jurisdictions?  
 
 127 This example could be complicated further by having the employee reside in State D when 
he works in State A, in State E when he works in State B and in State F when he works in State C.  
As the state of residence, D, E and F might also assert the primacy of its respective vesting 
schedule. 
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Or does the employee drop from the plan as he moves from State A to 
State B with its tougher participation requirement?  Again, federal 
legislation, providing nationally uniform participation rules, is a 
compelling solution to these conflict-of-law quandaries. 
In contrast, medical coverage does not involve a cumulative right 
that grows over time in different states.  Rather, the employee is, at any 
one time, a resident of only one state.  Consequently none of the 
conflict-of-law issues that arise for pensions arise for medical care. 
Assume now a world in which the states can regulate all employer-
provided medical coverage including employers’ self-funded plans.  In 
this hypothetical world, when an employee lives in State A, he is 
covered by whatever rules prevail there.  When he moves to State B, his 
medical care entitlement may change under the laws of his new state, 
but there is no implication for the coverage he previously enjoyed in 
State A (it is over) or for the coverage he will subsequently enjoy in 
State C (it has not yet begun).  Indeed, in the world as it exists today, if 
an employer purchases different medical insurance policies in States A, 
B, and C, this mobile employee may already receive different health 
care coverage as he moves from state to state. 
In particular cases, those differences might be harmful to the 
employee, if, for example, the new state does not require a treatment the 
employee was receiving in his old state.  Alternatively, state-by-state 
differentials might help the employee, if, for example, the new state 
requires coverage that the old state does not.  In the former case, the 
employee might demand as a precondition of the transfer that the 
employer continue to pay for medical costs that were insured before the 
transfer.  Or an interstate employer might, on its own, provide self-
insured benefits in excess of the mandated state minima for insurance. 
In any case, there is no conflict-of-law argument for federal 
regulation of medical care as there is for pensions.  The entitlement to 
medical care is discrete, not cumulative.  In the medical care context, 
movement to a new state with a different legal regime poses no difficult 
conflict-of-law problems, as it would for state-regulated pensions.  
There is, consequently, no compelling argument for national regulation 
of medical plans, as there is for pension plans. 
I have previously urged abolition of Section 514(a) on federalism 
grounds.128  The Maryland Act reinforces the argument for such 
abolition of ERISA preemption.  As a normative matter, Maryland 
should be free to experiment as to health care regulation—though, under 




 128 See Zelinsky, Against, supra note 58; Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58. 
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IV.     IS THE ACT SOUND POLICY? 
 
This brings us to the final inquiry: Does the Maryland Wal-Mart 
Act, independent of its status under ERISA, represent sound policy?  
My conclusion is negative.  While, as a matter of federalism, Maryland 
should be free to adopt the Act in the interests of experimentation, on 
the merits, the Act is an ill-conceived experiment.  For the short-run, the 
Act hurts Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-income customers by raising 
Wal-Mart’s prices.  For the long-run, the Act hurts those customers as 
well as workers, who forfeit employment with Wal-Mart as a result of 
the costs the Act imposes on Wal-Mart.  In contrast to the Act, there are 
carefully-crafted means by which Maryland (and other states) can assist 
low-income workers, including the establishment and expansion of state 
earned income tax credits.  The Act is designed not to mandate a broad 
expansion of employment-based medical coverage, but, rather, to make 
a largely symbolic attack on Wal-Mart. 
 
A.     The Act’s Short-Run Effects on Consumer Prices 
 
To gauge the initial economic impact of the Act, let us start with 
the assumption that, for the short-run, Wal-Mart’s demand for labor is 
inelastic, that is to say, price-insensitive.  As a first cut, this assumption 
is credible since the substitution of capital for higher-priced labor does 
not occur instantaneously.  Thus, Wal-Mart (or any other covered 
employer), for the short-run, will respond to the Act by retaining all of 
its Maryland employees, though it is more expensive than before to do 
so. 
 



















The vertical curve DL in Figure 1 reflects this assumption about 
Wal-Mart’s demand for labor, i.e., that the Act and the costs it imposes 
on Wal-Mart will not initially depress the number of Wal-Mart 
employees in Maryland.  S is the labor supply curve Wal-Mart 
confronted before the adoption of the Act.  S1 is S shifted to the left to 
reflect the extra health care costs imposed upon Wal-Mart by the Act.  
S1 is the labor supply curve Wal-Mart confronts under the Act. 
P1 is the wage Wal-Mart paid prior to adoption of the Act.  Wal-
Mart’s total labor costs (including the cost of whatever medical care 
Wal-Mart furnished to employees before adoption of the Act) are 
represented by the rectangle (P1, X, Q1, O).  The rectangle (P2, Y, X, P1) 
represents the extra health care costs Wal-Mart will pay in the short-run 
to comply with the Act. 
Figure 1 captures the benign scenario promised by supporters of 
the Act.  No one loses his job because of the costs the Act imposes on 
Wal-Mart.  As a result of the Act, Wal-Mart finances health care for 
previously uncovered employees or increases its medical outlays for its 
already covered employees or does some of both.  Given the assumption 
of short-run inelasticity in the demand for labor, it is plausible to 
conclude that, as an initial matter, the Act causes a certain number of 
Wal-Mart employees to obtain employer-provided medical coverage 
with no job loss to the Wal-Mart workforce. 
It is, however, implausible to conclude that the Act’s short-run 
consequences end at this happy point.  The Act increases Wal-Mart’s 
cost of doing business in Maryland by the amount (P2, Y, X, P1).  Wal-






























Figure 2 represents Wal-Mart’s relationship with its customers, 
before and after the adoption of the Maryland Act.  Prior to the adoption 
of the Act, Wal-Mart sold to its customers at prices (P1) based on the 
costs reflected in initial supply curve S and the demand of Wal-Mart 
customers as represented by DC.  The Act increases Wal-Mart’s costs, 
resulting in S1 and higher prices (P2) for Wal-Mart consumers.  Faced 
with these higher prices, the quantity of Wal-Mart goods demanded by 
Wal-Mart customers decreases from Q1 to Q2.  The goods these 
consumers still buy from Wal-Mart are now higher priced (P2 rather 
than P1) because those prices embody the costs of the health care 
expenses mandated by the Act.  The triangle ABC represents the well-
known consumer dead-weight loss,129 i.e., the loss in consumer welfare 
to Wal-Mart shoppers who, responding to higher prices, transfer their 
purchases from the now more expensive Wal-Mart goods they 
previously bought to other less desirable goods.130 
Thus, the short-run welfare gain to Wal-Mart employees (more 
medical coverage) is counterbalanced by the economic cost to Wal-Mart 
customers (higher prices at Wal-Mart, dead-weight loss from the price-
induced shift to other merchants). 
 
 129 See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 292 (5th ed. 
2001). 
 130 If these alternative non-Wal-Mart goods had been more desirable, consumers would have 
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In public choice terms,131 the Act presents a politically compelling 
trade-off for Maryland’s legislators since the Wal-Mart workers 
acquiring health care coverage are a concentrated group of Maryland 
voters for whom the advantage of the Act will be apparent in the form 
of their new coverage.  In contrast, the costs of the Act will be spread 
among a diffuse group (Wal-Mart customers) and will largely be hidden 
from the members of that group since those costs will be embedded in 
the prices charged by Wal-Mart.132  From a public choice perspective, 
the adoption of the Act reflects a straightforward political calculus.  By 
enacting the Act, Maryland’s legislators bestowed visible largesse upon 
an identifiable group of voters while imposing the costs of that largesse 
on disorganized persons who will largely be unaware of those costs. 
Indeed, in public choice terms, the Act is particularly attractive to 
Maryland legislators since at least some, perhaps most, of the Wal-Mart 
customers who will pay for the costs of the Act are not Maryland 
residents.  Wal-Mart (like any other corporation likely to trigger the 
coverage of the Act) is an integrated, national firm.  Hence, the costs of 
the Act will likely be shifted, not just to Wal-Mart customers in 
Maryland, but to Wal-Mart customers throughout the nation, perhaps 
even internationally.133 
While some of these Wal-Mart customers may be affluent, the 
typical Wal-Mart consumer in the United States is not.134  The 
 
 131 Public choice theory conceives of elected officials as self-maximizing political 
entrepreneurs who, to maintain power, bestow visible largesse on well-organized interest groups 
while diffusing the costs of that largesse among the disorganized and the unknowing.  See 
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense 
of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 (1993); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public 
Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369 (1993). 
 132 Wal-Mart could try to disclose costs on price tags or in other forms of in-store publicity.  I 
am skeptical of the efficacy of such efforts. 
 133 Some might be tempted to use this analysis to bolster the normative case for ERISA 
preemption: Maryland (or any other state) can export the cost of medical care for its residents to 
Wal-Mart’s customers in other states, indeed, maybe to Wal-Mart’s customers abroad.  These 
externally imposed costs argue for federal, rather than, state regulation. 
  The problem with this argument is that it proves too much.  All state tax and regulatory 
policies affect national corporations and, as a matter of economics, are exported to out-of-state 
customers.  If, for example, Maryland increases real property taxes to improve public schools, 
that cost too would be reflected in Wal-Mart’s prices for its non-Maryland customers.  I see no 
reason to distinguish state policies vis-a-vis medical care from these other state tax and regulatory 
programs.  Unless we are prepared to preempt all because they can be exported, I do not see why 
we should preempt some. 
 134 Wal-Mart President Lee Scott recently supported an increase in the minimum wage.  
According to a Wal-Mart spokesman, Wal-Mart favors a minimum wage increase because of its 
“beneficial effect on our customers.”  Jon Gertner, What Is a Living Wage?, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 15, 
2006, § 6 (Magazine),at 43 . 
  One student of Wal-Mart characterizes Wal-Mart as having a “fixation on low-income 
consumers.”  He similarly defines Wal-Mart’s core customers as “working-class ‘loyalists.’”  
ANTHONY BIANCO, THE BULLY OF BENTONVILLE 271, 288 (2006). 
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advocates of “living wage” proposals to increase the minimum wage 
often appeal to the image of the low-paid waiter working in a high-
priced restaurant, imagery which many (myself included) find quite 
powerful: Wealthy and middle class restaurant customers can afford to 
pay a little more to help those less fortunate.135  However, for the Act, a 
quite different picture emerges.  At least some (perhaps many) Wal-
Mart customers earn less than Wal-Mart’s rank-and-file employees—
and, for the short run, those customers will, via higher prices, finance 
the health care benefits provided to those employees under the Act. 
Moreover, in public choice terms, there is a second, perhaps even 
more important, constituency benefiting from the Act—Maryland’s 
unions.  Via the Act, Maryland’s unions protect the higher 
compensation standards those unions have obtained from Wal-Mart’s 
competitors.  The Act, by forcing Wal-Mart to come closer to unionized 
standards for medical care, abates the downward pressure Wal-Mart 
would otherwise place on those standards in the labor market. 
Both Wal-Mart and its critics agree that central to Wal-Mart’s 
business model is its militant opposition to unions, opposition which 
allows Wal-Mart to pay significantly lower compensation than is paid 
by Wal-Mart’s unionized competitors.  This compensation differential is 
particularly salient as Wal-Mart, through its supercenters, becomes a 
dominant force in the grocery industry.  “Wal-Mart’s labor cost 
advantage looms especially large in the grocery trade, where most big 
chains are locked into contracts assuring even their lowest-paid workers 
about 20 percent to 30 percent more than their counterparts make at 
Wal-Mart.”136 
Until recently, the compensation differential between Wal-Mart 
and its unionized competitors has presented two choices to the unions 
representing employees at those competitors.  These unions can 
organize Wal-Mart’s workforce to achieve unionized compensation 
levels at Wal-Mart or can reduce the compensation paid by Wal-Mart’s 
competitors to permit them to compete with Wal-Mart.  The first 
alternative has so far proved unavailing while the second alternative is 
understandably unappealing to unions and their members. 
The Act gives Maryland’s unions a third alternative, a state-
mandated minimum which forces Wal-Mart to come closer to the 
compensation packages provided to the unionized workforces of Wal-
Mart’s rivals in the marketplace.  As I discuss below,137 the Act and 
similar state laws present their own dilemmas for unions, dilemmas 
 
 135 Gertner, supra note 134, at 45 (estimating that, to pay for the Santa Fe, New Mexico living 
wage, “restaurants and hotels and stores would probably need to raise prices between 1 and 3 
percent”). 
 136 BIANCO, supra note 134, at 200-01. 
 137 See discussion infra Part IV.D.  
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which, I suggest, explain the Act’s more problematic features.  For now, 
the point is that Maryland’s unions are, in public choice terms, a second 
(perhaps even the primary) beneficiary of the Act insofar as the Act 
forces Wal-Mart to move toward the compensation standards prevailing 
at Wal-Mart’s unionized competitors.  The Act thereby protects 
unionized standards for medical care from the downward pressure Wal-
Mart would otherwise exert in the labor market by decreasing the 
compensation differential between Wal-Mart employees and the 
unionized employees of Wal-Mart’s competitors.  This, in turn, abates 
the competitive pressure on unions to reduce the medical benefits they 
have obtained for their members at Wal-Mart’s rivals in the 
marketplace. 
This vantage helps to explain the AFL-CIO’s strong support for the 
Maryland Act and similar laws in other states.138  Unions affiliated with 
the AFL-CIO are prime beneficiaries of the Act as the Act protects 
unionized compensation standards for health care by diminishing the 
differential between Wal-Mart and its unionized competitors.  And, as 
just observed, the political cost to a Maryland legislator of 
accommodating Maryland’s unions via the Act is minimal since those 
costs are spread in opaque fashion among an unorganized constituency, 
namely, Wal-Mart shoppers. 
This vantage also explains why Giant Foods supports the Act.139  
Although Giant Foods is a for-profit employer with more than 10,000 
Maryland employees, Giant Foods’ medical care outlays exceed twenty 
percent of its Maryland payroll, far above the eight percent minimum 
required by the Act.  By forcing Wal-Mart, a direct grocery competitor 
of Giant Foods, to meet that eight percent minimum, the Act reduces 
Wal-Mart’s competitive advantage vis-a-vis Giant Foods and, perhaps, 
lays the groundwork for a further reduction of that advantage in the 
future if the minimum is subsequently increased. 
In response to this analysis, I can envision at least two responses 
by supporters of the Act, neither of which seems persuasive.  First, such 
supporters might argue that Wal-Mart will absorb the costs of the Act, 
rather than pass those costs onto Wal-Mart’s customers.  Second, 
supporters of the Act might argue that the magnitude of the cost 
imposed on each Wal-Mart customer is small relative to the benefit 
obtained by each newly-covered Wal-Mart employee. 
 
 138 See AFL-CIO, THE WAL-MART TAX, SHIFTING HEALTH CARE COSTS TO TAXPAYERS 
 2 (2006), http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/walmart/upload/walmartreport_031406.pdf 
(“Maryland is the first state to hold giant companies such as Wal-Mart accountable for paying 
their fair share of workers’ health care costs.”). 
 139 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md. 
2006) (“Giant Food, which actively lobbied for enactment of the legislation, spends substantially 
in excess of 8% of the total wages it pays to employees in Maryland on health insurance costs.”); 
see also Brandolph, supra note 36. 
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It is possible that Wal-Mart, confronted with consumer resistance 
to higher prices, will find it economically efficient to absorb some of the 
health care costs imposed by the Act.  However, as a for-profit firm, 
Wal-Mart (or any other covered employer) will shift to its customers as 
much of those costs as is economically feasible.  Ultimately, it is an 
empirical enterprise to identify the elasticity of Wal-Mart consumer 
demand and the consequent ability of Wal-Mart to shift the costs of the 
Act to its customers in the form of higher prices.  However, it is 
implausible to assume that Wal-Mart will voluntarily absorb all costs of 
the Act and will shift none of those costs to Wal-Mart’s customers.  
Indeed, it is more compelling to assume that Wal-Mart, given its 
dominance in many markets and product lines, will largely shift the 
costs of complying with the Act to Wal-Mart customers. 
I am also skeptical that the price impact of the Act on Wal-Mart’s 
customers should be dismissed as de minimis.  In this context consider 
as an alternative to the Act a state income tax surcharge financing 
medical coverage.  Assume that this hypothetical surcharge 
predominantly falls upon lower-income taxpayers and raises the same 
amount as the extra health care costs imposed by the Act on Wal-Mart.  
I doubt that many supporters of the Act would embrace such a tax 
surcharge.  Indeed, I am confident that most of those supporters would 
criticize such a surcharge as regressive in impact, as indeed it would be. 
However, in distributional terms, the Act and this hypothetical 
surcharge are similar.  The principal difference between the two is 
transparency; the surcharge would be imposed openly on less affluent 
taxpayers to finance medical care.  In contrast, the economic impact of 
the Act on that same group in their capacity as Wal-Mart customers is 
hidden since that cost is embedded in Wal-Mart’s prices.  If the impact 
of the transparent tax surcharge cannot be dismissed as de minimis, 
neither should the equivalent effects of the more opaque Act.  
 
B.     The Act’s Long-Run Effects on Employment 
 
While it is plausible to assume that Wal-Mart’s demand for labor is 
inelastic in the short-run, it is unconvincing to persist in that assumption 
for the long-run.  For-profit businesses minimize their costs.  Wal-Mart, 
in particular, has a hard-earned reputation for finding efficiencies in its 
operations.140  For the long-run, Wal-Mart will reduce its now higher-
 
 140 See, e.g., CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT 8 (2006) (describing Wal-Mart’s 
“culture of looking for every penny of cost savings that could be wrung out of designs, 
packaging, labor, materials, transportation, even the stocking of stores.  It is that cascade of 
frugality, questions, and pressure that creates the Wal-Mart effect.”); see also Brannon P. 
Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce 
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priced Maryland workforce, by substituting capital for labor and by 
deploying workers in ways that were inefficient before the Act but that 




















Thus, for the long-run, Wal-Mart confronts a downward sloping 
demand curve for labor.  Figure 3 has the same supply curves as Figure 
1, again reflecting Wal-Mart’s labor costs before (S) and after (S1) the 
adoption of the Act.  However, in Figure 3, the long-run demand curve 
for labor, DL, slopes downward since Wal-Mart (or any other covered 
employer) will, for the long term, respond to higher prices for labor by 
purchasing less labor.  For the long-run, Wal-Mart’s Maryland 
employment will drop from Q1 before the Act to Q2 after the Act is 
adopted. 
Some supporters of the Act might acknowledge that Wal-Mart will 
employ fewer workers because of the costs imposed by the Act, but 
might view reduced employment as a price worth paying to increase the 
number of remaining Wal-Mart employees with medical coverage.  Not 
so fast.  Given the minimum mandated by the Act (eight percent of total 
payroll), it is possible that the Act could cause a net reduction in the 
number of Wal-Mart employees with medical coverage.  By reducing 
the denominator of the relevant fraction (total payroll), Wal-Mart could 
comply with the Act while decreasing the scope of its medical coverage. 
 
Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAW. 907, 941 (2005) (“Volume buying enables Wal-Mart to 
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A numerical example confirms this possibility: Suppose that, prior 
to the adoption of the Act, a covered, for-profit employer has 20,000 
Maryland employees, that the total annual payroll for this workforce is 
$20,000,000, that the covered employer pays $1,200,000 yearly for 
employee medical coverage, and that that coverage extends to 4,000 
employees.  On these numbers, the employer flunks the Act’s test since 
the employer only devotes six percent of total payroll to medical care.141 
Suppose further that, after the Act is adopted, the employer, 
responding to the now-higher price for Maryland labor, reduces its 
Maryland workforce to 14,000 employees, that 200 of the employees 
terminated had medical coverage, that the cost of such coverage 
consequently drops to $1,120,000 and that the total payroll for this now-
reduced workforce declines to $14,000,000. 
In this hypothetical, the employer, by reducing its workforce and 
payroll, complies with the Maryland Act since the employer’s reduced 
medical costs ($1,120,000) satisfy the statutorily-required eight percent 
of total payroll ($14,000,000).  Even though total medical outlays and 
the number of covered employees have both declined, total payroll has 
declined relatively more.  The covered employer has thus complied with 
the Act, not by extending medical coverage, but by reducing its payroll.  
In a world of unintended consequences, a scenario along these lines 
cannot be dismissed.  Indeed, Maryland’s Attorney General cites this 
possibility in his defense of the Act from ERISA preemption.142 
In any event, a long-run increase in employee medical coverage, 
should it occur, will be purchased by sacrificing the jobs of some 
persons who otherwise would be employed by Wal-Mart and by 
increasing prices for Wal-Mart customers.  Consequently, for the long-
run, the Act engenders a trade-off between the consumer welfare of 
Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-income customers and the well-being of 
Wal-Mart’s comparably unaffluent workforce.  To the extent the costs 
of the Act are shifted forward to Wal-Mart’s customers in the form of 
 
 141 $1,200,000/$20,000,000=6%.  Note that, if this employer is a nonprofit entity, it passes 
muster under the Maryland Act, which imposes a lesser requirement on nonprofit employers.  As 
I discuss infra Part IV.E, there is no policy justification for this lesser standard for large 
nonprofits. 
 142 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 3 (Wal-Mart can comply with the Maryland 
Act by “reduc[ing] the number of employees it has in the State [or] reduc[ing] pay . . . .”)  The 
Attorney General argues that these possibilities indicate that the Act is not ERISA-preempted.  
For the reasons discussed in the text, I disagree, i.e., under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 
85 (1983), the Act refers to and has a connection with Wal-Mart’s ERISA-regulated medical 
plans; under N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645 (1995), the Act mandates Wal-Mart’s level of medical outlays and impairs nationally 
uniform administration; under the reasoned textualist approach, the Act intrudes upon Wal-Mart’s 
zone of welfare plan autonomy by regulating medical plan participation and funding. 
  Nevertheless, I agree with the Attorney General that Wal-Mart might respond to the Act by 
reducing Maryland employment or compensation, even though I disagree with the Attorney 
General as to the legal implications of that possibility. 
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higher prices, jobs are preserved at the expense of those customers.  To 
the extent the costs of the Act are shifted back to the persons who would 
otherwise have worked for Wal-Mart, customers are spared higher 
prices but those unemployed persons bear the impact of the Act in the 
form of lost job opportunities.  A particularly ironic possibility is that 
some of these unemployed persons, who otherwise would have worked 
at Wal-Mart and been covered by Wal-Mart’s medical plans, will 
instead utilize Maryland’s Medicaid program.  There is, as the old 
proverb has it, no free lunch. 
In contemporary debate about “living wage” proposals, many 
advocates of such proposals deny that there is any reduction of 
employment when such proposals are enacted.  In effect, these 
advocates suggest that Figure 1 with its inelastic demand curve for labor 
reflects, not just the short-run, but the long-run as well.  No doubt, there 
are defenders of the Maryland Act who believe this also and who deny 
that the Act will have any impact on Wal-Mart’s employment in 
Maryland. 
I find this characterization of Wal-Mart’s long-term demand for 
labor implausible.  But, in any event, even if this characterization is 
correct, it poses a dilemma for supporters of the Act.  If Wal-Mart’s 
demand for labor is indeed inelastic for the long-run, the Act will not 
diminish Wal-Mart’s Maryland employment but, instead, the costs of 
the Act will be shifted onto Wal-Mart’s mostly unaffluent customers in 
the form of higher prices. 
Again, the question must be asked: Would the Maryland legislature 
have openly voted for a transparent program achieving this result, such 
as a tax surcharge impacting principally on lower income persons?  I 
doubt it.  As noted earlier,143 public choice theory suggests a favorable 
political calculation underlying the Act.  Legislators, through the Act, 
bestow perceptible largesse upon their Maryland constituents who work 
for Wal-Mart and who obtain medical coverage because of the Act.  
Legislators, through the Act, also advantage unions which benefit from 
the Act insofar as the Act protects unionized compensation standards by 
forcing Wal-Mart to come closer to the medical care coverage such 
unions have negotiated at Wal-Mart’s competitors.  The costs of this 
largesse, embedded in Wal-Mart’s prices, will largely be obscured from 
most Wal-Mart customers who pay it.  Quite probably, many of those 
customers live outside of Maryland.  In pure political terms, this is an 
attractive trade-off: grateful voters and unions receiving benefits, 
largely ignorant (often out-of-state) consumers bearing the costs. 
In contrast, a tax surcharge, or other more transparent proposal in 
lieu of the Act, changes the political calculus.  Those paying the taxes 
 
 143 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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for increased medical coverage are more likely to perceive the costs 
inflicted upon them. 
Behavioral economics144 suggests a more benign explanation for 
the Maryland legislature’s willingness to adopt the Act, but not an 
equivalent tax surcharge.  From this perspective, some legislators 
succumb to “framing effects,” viewing economically comparable 
programs as substantively different depending upon the way those 
programs are framed.  Such legislators may genuinely, if naively, view 
the Act as different from an economically comparable tax program. 
In enacting the Act, the Maryland legislature likely had some 
members who made the political calculation predicted by public choice 
theory while others were the financially naive decision makers of 
behavioral economics.  The members of a legislative majority need not 
reason to their respective results in the same way. 
Consider finally the possibility that Wal-Mart will shift the costs of 
the Act to Wal-Mart’s suppliers by demanding lower prices to offset 
those costs.  Wal-Mart is well-known for the pricing pressure it exerts 
on the companies that sell to it.145  Perhaps the costs of the Act will 
ultimately be passed on to those companies in the form of Wal-Mart’s 
demand for even lower prices. 
I doubt that many (perhaps any) supporters of the Act intend for 
the costs of that law to be foisted onto Wal-Mart’s suppliers.  Wal-
Mart’s often-brutal price pressure on its suppliers is one of the most 
compelling elements of the anti-Wal-Mart narrative.146  It is unlikely 
that the Maryland legislators who voted for the Act sought complicity in 
this aspect of Wal-Mart’s business model. 
Nevertheless, at first blush, Wal-Mart’s customers and employees 
will be spared the costs of the Act if Wal-Mart can pass those costs to 
its suppliers in the form of even lower prices as the precondition for 
selling to Wal-Mart.  On second thought, however, this merely moves 
the costs of the Act onto the suppliers’ employees and non-Wal-Mart 
customers who, in turn, will themselves engage in further cost-shifting.  
The ultimate impact of the Act is thus opaque and likely quite 
regressive, particularly insofar as the costs of the Act fall upon the 
nonaffluent employees of Wal-Mart’s suppliers in the form of reduced 




 144 Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer 
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. 
TAX REV. 797 (2005). 
 145 BIANCO, supra note 134, at 182 (“For suppliers, doing business with Bentonville is a 
Faustian bargain.”). 
 146 Id. 
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C.     Alternatives to the Act: State Earned Income Tax Credits 
 
It is instructive to compare the Maryland Act with the alternatives 
available to legislators seeking to assist low-income workers in 
Maryland and in other states.  Chief among these alternatives is the 
expansion (or establishment) of state earned income tax credits (EITCs) 
for such workers.  This comparison confirms the superiority of the tax 
credit to the Act as a device for helping less affluent workers. 
States’ EITCs are modeled on the federal EITC147 and usually 
piggy-back on the federal credit.  Maryland’s EITC is typical, pegged at 
the lesser of fifty percent of the taxpayer’s federal EITC or the 
taxpayer’s Maryland income tax liability.148  The credit constitutes both 
financial support from the public fisc and a reward for work since the 
credit is bestowed only on low-income taxpayers who have earned 
income.  Since the EITC is financed by the public treasury, rather than 
by private businesses, the credit does not distort business behavior, 
forcing firms to raise prices, to reduce employment, or some of both.  
Such credits, financed by state income tax revenues, are (unlike the Act) 
funded by middle- and upper-income taxpayers, not by less affluent 
Wal-Mart shoppers paying higher prices. 
The Maryland legislature, if it seeks additional succor for low-
income workers, could increase the size of the Maryland EITC, now 
limited to half of the federal credit.  Maryland, for example, could 
enlarge its credit to, say, seventy percent of the federal credit to which 
the taxpayer is entitled.  Alternatively (or in addition), the Maryland 
legislature could eliminate the ceiling which caps the Maryland credit at 
the taxpayer’s Maryland income tax liability.  Maryland could instead 
make its EITC, like the federal credit, refundable.  Thus, if the credit 
exceeds the taxpayer’s Maryland tax liability, the Maryland treasury 
would send the taxpayer a check for the excess. 
States like Connecticut, which lack a state EITC, could amend 
their respective income tax statutes to include such a credit.149 
Why would a Maryland legislator, concerned about the welfare of 
low-income workers, prefer the Act to an expansion of the EITC?  On 
the merits, the EITC prevails in any comparison.  The EITC applies to 
all low-income workers, not just to those hired by a particular firm.  The 
credit does not dampen employment nor is it paid for by persons who 
themselves are struggling financially. 
 
 147 I.R.C. § 32 (2000). 
 148 MD. CODE. ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-704(b) (West 2006). 
 149 See, e.g., S.B. 135, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006) (introduced on February 
16, 2006 by Sen. Looney proposing a refundable EITC for Connecticut); H.B. 5413, 2006 Gen. 
Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006) (introduced on February 17, 2006 by Rep. O’Brien proposing 
an EITC for Connecticut). 
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On the negative side of the ledger, the EITC has proved complex 
and difficult to administer.150  On the other hand, important laws are 
often complicated and hard to implement.151  Moreover, in a case like 
Maryland’s, the basic administrative costs of implementing the EITC 
are already incurred at the credit’s current level.  While those 
administrative costs might increase somewhat if the credit is expanded 
or made refundable, those incremental administrative costs do not seem 
significant. 
Some supporters of the Act no doubt feel that the state should force 
low-income workers to take their compensation in the form of medical 
care rather than cash.  But even that objection to an expanded EITC 
could be met by allocating EITC refunds to state-administered medical 
accounts upon which each low-income worker could draw for health 
care for him and his dependents. 
From this comparison, the Act emerges as an essentially symbolic 
gesture, politically attractive because bashing Wal-Mart is a good sound 
bite today and because the Act’s costs are largely obscured from those 
who pay such costs as higher prices and reduced long-run employment.  
In contrast to the Act, expanding or establishing the state EITC is a 
politically-accountable action since the legislature, reducing tax 
collections via an enlarged credit, must in response either decrease 
public spending or raise other revenues.  As a device to help the 
working poor, expanding (or establishing) a state EITC wins hands 
down.  
The EITC is not the only option available to Maryland’s legislators 
if they seek to go beyond symbolism and genuinely assist Maryland’s 
working poor.  Another compelling model is the federal tax credit for 
low-income workers who contribute to individual retirement accounts, 
401(k) plans and similar arrangements.152  Maryland (or any other state) 
could easily adapt that model to provide broad tax-based assistance to 
low-income workers to help them defray their outlays for medical 
insurance premiums and co-payments. 
In short, if the legislature of Maryland (or of any other state) seeks 
to provide broad assistance to the working poor, there are good options, 
 
 150 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 
EMORY L.J. 755, 767 (2005) (“EITC errors are made by taxpayers, tax preparers, and IRS staff.”); 
see also Dustin Stamper, Treasury, IRS Programs Get Fair Marks on New OMB Report Card, 
110 TAX NOTES 699 (2006) (“The credit has long been a lightning rod for criticism for both its 
high alleged abuse rates and the number of eligible taxpayers who do not claim it.”). 
 151 For example, the Homestead Act, justly celebrated as one of the great success stories of 
American history, had more than its share of administrative problems.  See LOUIS S. WARREN, 
BUFFALO BILL’S AMERICA: WILLIAM CODY AND THE WILD WEST SHOW 72 (2005) (“Settlers 
had their own share of tricks.  After 1862, the federal government deeded 285 million acres to 
homesteaders.  Half their claims were fraudulent, backed by false identities, fake improvements, 
or worse.”). 
 152 I.R.C. § 25B. 
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options preferable to the Act.  When the Act is compared with possible 
tax credits to help low income individuals and families, the Act emerges 
as an essentially symbolic gesture, rather than a carefully-crafted 
program to help the poor. 
 
D.     The Design of the Act 
 
The final policy argument against the Act is the Act’s poor design.  
Assume for purposes of this discussion a decision in favor of state-
mandated, employer-provided medical insurance.153  Given the decision 
to pursue this course, the Act implements it quite poorly. 
We have already seen154 how the Act creates a perverse incentive 
for a covered employer to decrease its total payroll, thereby elevating its 
current (or even reduced) medical outlays to the statutory requirement, 
eight percent of total payroll. 
Other features of the Act are equally problematic.  A covered 
employer under the Act is one with 10,000 or more Maryland 
employees.  There is no pretense here that the Act mandates broad 
medical coverage for the Maryland workforce.  The Act is a 
gerrymander, narrowly targeted to reach Wal-Mart and Wal-Mart alone.  
If the Maryland legislature seriously believes that Maryland should 
require employer-financed medical care, why should Maryland not 
mandate such care for employees of smaller firms?  Why establish the 
threshold for mandated health coverage at 10,000 employees?  Why not 
at 5000 employees?  Or 1000 employees?  Why exempt other large 
firms and just concentrate on Wal-Mart?  Except for Wal-Mart’s 
symbolic attractiveness, there is no reason for the Act’s arbitrary 
coverage. 
Equally arbitrary is the Act’s mandate that a covered employer 
must expend at least eight percent of total payroll for medical care.  
Again, the Maryland legislature adopted this number because Wal-Mart 
falls below this statutory threshold while other firms the legislature 
chose to spare already exceed it. 
Particularly intriguing in this respect is the special rule for 
nonprofit employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees.  Under 
the Act, these nonprofit firms need devote only six percent of total 
payroll to medical care.  In practice, this special treatment for large 
nonprofit employers extends to a single institution, Johns Hopkins 
 
 153 Massachusetts has adopted a comprehensive statute which, in sharp contrast to Maryland’s 
narrowly-targeted Wal-Mart Act, attempts to establish universal health care coverage.  See H.B. 
4479, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); see also Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima, 
Massachusetts Legislation on Insurance Becomes Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A13. 
 154 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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University, the only Maryland nonprofit that employs 10,000 or more 
employees.155  By virtue of the lower requirement (six percent of 
payroll) applying to it, Johns Hopkins need not expand its medical 
coverage while Wal-Mart must.  Why, it must be asked, is a clerk 
employed by Johns Hopkins less worthy of state-mandated employer-
financed medical care than is a clerk engaged by Wal-Mart? 
In public choice terms, there are two (mutually compatible) 
explanations for the arbitrary decisions embodied in the Act.  First, 
exempting Maryland’s other major employers dampened or deflected 
such employers’ potential opposition to the Act.  The second 
explanation stems from the dilemma confronting the unions embracing 
the Act as a device that protects unionized compensation standards 
against Wal-Mart’s downward pressure in the marketplace.156 
On the one hand, these unions desire the Act as a state-mandated 
floor that reduces the differential between Wal-Mart’s compensation 
standards and the higher, unionized standards prevailing at Wal-Mart’s 
competitors.  On the other hand, these unions do not want the state to 
displace them as the guarantors of their members’ compensation 
packages.  If Maryland, by statute, assures everyone in Maryland of 
employer-provided health care, collective bargaining for such care 
becomes superfluous. 
Thus, the unions want an Act that solves (or at least abates) their 
Wal-Mart problem by lifting Wal-Mart’s compensation package closer 
to unionized standards, thereby reducing the pressure on the unions to 
make concessions.  However, the unions do not want an Act which 
extends any further than Wal-Mart since they want the collective 
bargaining the unions provide (not the legislature) to be the forum to 
which their members look for compensation improvements. 
Ultimately, the nicest characterization of the Act is that it is a 
jumble of compromises, reflecting the rough-and-tumble of practical 
politics and Wal-Mart’s symbolic attractiveness as a target.  Less 
diplomatically, as a matter of policy, the Act’s design makes no sense. 
 
E.     Summary 
 
In a world without ERISA preemption, the Maryland Act would 
still be ill-conceived.  As a matter of policy, the Act imposes its costs on 
Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-income customers who will pay higher 
prices because of the Act and on workers who would, but for the Act, 
 
 155 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that the only Maryland 
employers with more than 10,000 employees are “Giant Food, Wal-Mart, and Johns Hopkins 
University”). 
 156 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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have jobs with Wal-Mart.  A legislature genuinely seeking to improve 
the condition of the working poor has available better-crafted 
alternatives, including expansion (or establishment) of the state EITC.  
On the merits, it is difficult to view the narrowly-targeted, poorly-




Under any of the plausible approaches to ERISA Section 514(a), 
ERISA preempts the Maryland “Wal-Mart” law and other laws like it.  
While I favor a world in which Maryland (or any other state) is free to 
experiment in the area of employer-provided health care, that is not the 
legal world as it exists today.  As a matter of law, Section 514(a), as it 
has been and as it could reasonably be construed, precludes state 
legislation like the Maryland Act.  The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland decided correctly when it held the Maryland Act to 
be ERISA-preempted. 
As a matter of policy, the Maryland statute is ill-conceived.  The 
Maryland legislature would not, in lieu of the Act, have adopted a 
politically transparent program (such as a tax surcharge) with similar 
impact upon lower-income persons.  Maryland and other states have far 
more compelling options for assisting low-income workers including 
expansion of state earned income tax credits.  In the final analysis, 
Maryland’s Wal-Mart statute is a poorly-designed exercise in political 
symbolism, not a carefully-crafted response to the urgent problem of 
health care in America. 
